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Abstract: This paper outlines relatively easy to implement reforms for the supervision of 
transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that should not be primarily based on legal form 
but on the actual risk structures of the pertinent financial institutions. The proposal also 
aims at paying close attention to the economics of public administration and international 
relations in allocating competences among national and supranational supervisory bodies.  
Before detailing the own proposition, this paper looks into the relationship between 
sovereign debt and banking crises that drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in 
the Euro area. These initiatives inter alia affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal 
element of crisis prevention.  
In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a per-
ceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, this paper scru-
tinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border business of 
financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers perspective. The analy-
sis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is available and concludes that 
banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, particularly because they are subject 
to (some) market discipline.  
The analysis proceeds with describing and evaluating how competences in prudential 
supervision are currently allocated among national and supranational supervisory authori-
ties. In order to assess the findings the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public 
administration and international relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to 
be more aligned with bureaucrats’ incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate 
and share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting re-
sponsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified.  
Resting on these foundations, the last part of this paper finally sketches an alterna-
tive solution that dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes 
and allocates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in cross-
border banking groups. 
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1  TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES IN BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVI-
SION 
1.1  THE REGULATORY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH INTEGRATED CROSS-BORDER 
BANKING GROUPS 
The conventional wisdom in banking theory suggests that allowing financial 
institutions to provide their services across jurisdictions generates significant benefits 
for society.1 Efficiency gains accrue with regard to banks’ core function as financial 
intermediaries: economies of scale lower the costs of bringing together capital sur-
pluses with capital needs. The demand-side benefits from improved access to credit 
where the funds stem from a larger pool of capital under management. The supply-
side sees savings allotted to the best investment opportunity picked from those avail-
able not only in the domestic market but in many countries. The latter makes banks’ 
portfolios more diverse and hence decreases the dependence of lending on local 
business cycles. Moreover, local capital markets also receive a boost from the arrival 
of international actors who bring with them advanced technologies of risk manage-
ment, payments and other service offerings as well as methods of information analy-
sis and distribution that local competitors can replicate.2  
                                            
1 E.g. Michael H. Moskow, Cross-Border Banking: Forces Driving Change and Result-
ing Regulatory Challenges,  in  CROSS-BORDER  BANKING  :  REGULATORY CHALLENGES  3, 4-5 
(Gerard Caprio, Jr., Douglas D. Evanoff & George G. Kaufman eds., 2006); Jonathan Fiecht-
er, İnci Ötker-Robe, Anna Ilyina, Michael Hsu, André Santos & Jay Surti, Subsidiaries or 
Branches: Does One Size Fit All? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper SDN/11/04, 2011), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdn1104.pdf. But see also infra 
note 44.  
2 For empirical evidence corroborating the latter hypothesis cf. Stijn Claessens, Asli 
Demirgüc-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, The Role of Foreign Banks in Domestic Banking Systems, 
in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION  OF FINANCIAL SERVICES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  117 (Stijn Claessens & Marion Jansen eds., 2000); Stijn Claessens, Asli 
Demirgüc-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, How Does Foreign Entry Affect Domestic Banking Mar-
kets?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 891-911 (2001) (both studies showing an increase in technical 
efficiency at domestic banks subsequent to the arrival of foreign banks in a sample of 80 
countries); see also Douglas Evanoff & Evren Ors, The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic 
Deregulation in Banking: The Implications for Productive Efficiency, 40 J. MONEY FIN. & 
BANKING 897-928 (2008) (showing the same effect on incumbent banks following a compet-3 
 
On the other hand, the trade-off  associated  with  the advantages of cross-
border banking is also straightforward: financial systems around the world become 
more and more interconnected which in turn expands the potential for negative 
spillover effects in times of crises.3 Exogenous shocks can affect national economies 
which originally did not face any problems in their banking sector. The availability 
of credit may decline, either because institutions troubled at home (or elsewhere) at 
least confine their activities on foreign markets where they formerly played a prom-
inent role in providing finance to local businesses4 or because international banks 
cut back on lending  in their home country  as a consequence of losses incurred 
abroad.5 In the latter case, the magnitude of the shocks originating overseas and the 
importance of the financial institutions affected may ultimately compel fiscally ex-
pensive6 and politically unpopular government bail-outs in order to avoid the dis-
ruptive consequences of a pivotal bank’s failure. 
                                                                                                                                        
itor’s out-of-state merger in the U.S.-banking sector between 1984 and 1999 using a sample 
of 2.309 such business combinations). 
3 For an assessment of the likelihood of cross-border spillovers in scenarios of credit 
and liquidity shocks, INT’L  MONETARY  FUND,  CROSS-CUTTING  THEMES IN ECONOMIES WITH 
LARGE  BANKING  SYSTEMS  11-12 (2010) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/041610.pdf  (considering economies of vari-
ous sizes with large banking systems finding only a low risk of outward spillovers but a ra-
ther high risk of inward contagion from abroad). 
4 For evidence that the current global financial crisis affected foreign lending of in-
ternational banks precisely in this way see e.g. Ralph de Haas & Iman van Lelyveld, Multi-
national Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm? (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 135, 2011) available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0135.pdf  (finding 
a slowdown in credit growth twice as rapid in a sample of the 48 largest multinational banks 
compared to a control group of 202 purely domestic banks); but see also John P. Bonin, 
From Reputation amidst Uncertainty to Commitment under Stress: More Than a Decade of 
Foreign-Owned Banking in Transition Economies, 52 COMP. ECON. STUDIES 466 (2010) (ar-
guing that foreign banks largely sustained their commitment to the markets of 10 European 
transition economies). 
5 With regard to the losses cross-border banking groups incurred as a result of the re-
cent crisis in Eastern Europe’s transition economies see Thomas Dietz, Tetiana Protysk & 
Erich Keller, Similar but Different? The Financial Crisis in Matured Western and Emerging 
Eastern European Countries, 4 BANKS & BANK SYSTEMS 20, 28 (2009) (arguing that Western 
European banks’ significant engagement in Eastern Europe constitutes a potential for (re-
)contagion in the ongoing financial crisis);  Ewald Nowotny, The Financial Crisis and the 
Role of Austrian Banks in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 17 ECON. & FIN. REV. 3 
(2010) (showing that the credit risk provisioning by Austrian banks’ Central, Eastern and 
Southeastern European subsidiaries rose sharply as a result of the 2008 crisis occurring on 
those foreign markets). For a description of the events leading to the collapse of the Iceland-
ic banking sector as a result of its disproportionate and mismanaged cross-border activities 
see Már Gudmundsson & Thorsteinn Thorgeirsson, The Fault Lines in Cross-Border Bank-
ing: Lessons from the Icelandic Case, in CONTAGION AND SPILLOVERS: NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE 
CRISIS 141 (Peter Backe, Ernest Gnan and Philipp Hartmann eds., 2010). 
6 For preliminary evidence that the recent bank bail-outs during the financial crisis 
were not as costly for governments as originally perceived and suggested by the enormous 
figures used in the recapitalizations, see Gérard Hertig, The Profitability of Bank Bail-Outs, 
Credit Crisis Comparative Case Studies, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. ▪▪▪ in this issue ▪▪▪ (2012).  4 
 
Public policy hence faces the challenge to minimize these potential downsides 
of cross-border banking without impeding its upside. One key element of the institu-
tional framework targeted at this ambitious goal is the  prudential  supervision  of 
banks.7 The distinctive feature in the context of cross-border banking is that policy-
makers and regulators operate in a quintessentially transnational setting where leg-
islatory intervention and its enforcement on a national level almost naturally create 
externalities,8 e.g. if a country deploys resources to facilitate the adequate micro-
prudential9 supervision of banks  incorporated under its jurisdiction  this  will also 
benefit all other countries where the respective financial institutions conduct busi-
ness. Yet, if these other countries engage in supervisory activities themselves, re-
dundancies and frictions in the legal framework, turf-wars among authorities etc. 
will raise the costs of doing business abroad and may compromise the effectiveness 
of the regulatory regime cross-border banks are subjected to.10  
The latter is all the more important, as a pivotal determinant of the regulatory 
framework seems endogenous from the perspective of the supervised financial insti-
                                            
7 For the general rationale of sovereign supervision of banks which in grosso modo 
aims at minimizing the probability and the impact of financial distress in the sector under 
the assumption that these goals are inadequately achieved through market discipline alone 
see already ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 756 (Roy Hutcheson Campbell  &  Andrew S. Skinner  eds., Clarendon Press 1976) 
(1776); for modern economists arguments cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY 
STABILITY  (1959);  MATHIAS  DEWATRIPONT  &  JEAN  TIROLE,  THE  PRUDENTIAL  REGULATION OF 
BANKS (1995); George J. Benston & George G. Kaufman, Is the Banking and Payments Sys-
tem Fragile?, 9 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 209 (1995); PETER D. SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REG-
ULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 193-208 (2000); Charles W. Calomiris, Blueprints for a new 
global financial architecture, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 259 (Leonardo Auern-
heimer ed., 2003); for a (critical) account of the history of banking regulation see CHARLES. 
W CALOMIRIS, UNITED STATES BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1-79 (2000); 
for the libertarian skepticism regarding the legitimacy of any regulatory interference in the 
banking sector FRIEDRICH AUGUST HAYEK, DENATIONALIZING MONEY (1976); DAVID GLASNER, 
FREE BANKING AND MONETARY REFORM (1989); KEVIN DOWD, THE STATE AND THE MONETARY 
SYSTEM (1989).  
8 For the reasons, why banks were traditionally regulated on a national level cf. Max-
imilian J.B. Hall & George G. Kaufman, International Banking Regulation, in THE STRUC-
TURAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 92 (Pier Carlo Padoan, Paul Brenton & Gavin 
Boyd eds. 2003). 
9 The term refers to a regulatory approach that aims at securing individual financial 
institutions resilience vis-à-vis external shocks and diverges in this limited goal from a mac-
ro-prudential approach that is targeted towards the soundness and viability of the financial 
system as a whole and accepts the existence of risk originating within the system, see e.g. 
Claudio Borrio, Towards a macroprudential framework for financial supervision and regula-
tion? 2-3 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 138, 2003); Samuel G. Hanson, 
Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, A macroprudential approach to financial regulation, 25 
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4-7 (2011).  
10 For a pre-crisis view on the regulatory challenges that cross-border banking posed 
to the emerging markets to which banks extend their business see Guillermo Ortiz, Cross 
Border Banking and the Challenges Faced by Host-Country Authorities, in CROSS-BORDER 
BANKING:  REGULATORY CHALLENGES  11, 14-18 (Gerard Caprio, Jr., Douglas D. Evanoff & 
George G. Kaufman eds., 2006) (accurately identifying differences in regulation and stake-
holder interests, the lack of market discipline, and the problems of cross-border crisis man-
agement as critical aspects). 5 
 
tutions: as will be discussed in more detail,11 currently the applicable supervisory 
regime hinges upon how banks choose to organize their international activities. In 
principle, a financial institution faces two alternatives if it seeks to establish a con-
tinuous and meaningful presence in a foreign market.12 It can either organize its for-
eign operations as a subsidiary, i.e. a legally independent, yet wholly owned entity 
incorporated under the laws of the foreign jurisdiction, or it can establish a branch, 
i.e. a legally dependent satellite of its main establishment fully recognized under the 
laws of the foreign country where the respective banking services will be provided.13 
Clearly, where the applicable law depends on choices of the regulated concern over 
potential regulatory arbitrage looms.14 Recent intra-group restructurings that at least 
coincided with some tightening in the regulatory regimes applicable to banks operat-
ing across borders at first glance seem to corroborate these apprehensions. 
1.2  INTRA-GROUP RESTRUCTURINGS AS A SIGN OF REGULATORY ARBITRAGE? 
1.2.1 EUROPE 
In Europe several transactions occurred very recently that followed a com-
mon template: in certain jurisdictions, the activities of large cross-border banking 
groups were transformed from subsidiaries into branches. The transactions were ex-
ecuted through a cross-border merger of the thus far independent foreign subsidiary 
into the parent corporation15 that instantaneously assigned the received assets to the 
newly established foreign branch on its balance sheet. As a consequence, the real-
world appearances of the banks’ foreign operations were not affected by the legal 
maneuver. Yet, the regime of prudential bank regulation and supervision of the re-
                                            
11 Cf. infra 4.  
12 The additional option to set up a representative office that can provide some auxil-
iary services abroad to the bank’s main operations is also well established under WTO rules, 
cf. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1b, art. XXVIII (g) footnote 12, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994). Yet, a representative office may be well suited to serve niche-markets, but it is prac-
tically inapt to establish a presence that broadly competes with domestic firms. This is even 
more true with regard to providing banking services directly across borders as permitted 
under The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, March 30, 2010, art. 56, 2010 
O.J. (C 83), 47 [hereinafter TFEU].  
13 For a broad survey of banks’ organizational preferences, see Eugenio Cerutti, Gio-
vanni Dell’Ariccia & Maria Soledad Martínez Pería, How Banks Go Abroad: Branches or 
Subsidiaries, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1669, 1685-1691 (2007) (identifying tax rates, regulatory 
barriers, diverging business models – commercial vs. retail banking – and economic and po-
litical risks as driving forces in a sample of the world’s 100 largest banks’ operations in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe). 
14 On the generally negative comprehension of the term that indicates a race for laxi-
ty in regulatory standards, Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International Secu-
rities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 567, 636 
(1998); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. 
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 32, 52  (2007). 
15 Such cross-jurisdictional transactions are facilitated by Parliament and Council Di-
rective 2005/56 of 26 October 2005 on Cross-border Mergers of Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 2005 O.J. (L 310) 1 and its implementation in the Member States’ merger statutes. 6 
 
spective host countries ceded to apply.16 The restructurings caught the attention of 
the business press where they were regarded as blatant acts of regulatory arbitrage:  
Banks Find New Wrinkle in Regulatory Arbitrage 
…. 
European Banks are restructuring their businesses outside their home 
countries in ways that mute the impact of tough new regulations that 
were adopted as a response to the financial crisis. In the U.S., U.K. and 
Portugal, at least a handful of large European banks have altered their 
legal structures or shifted assets and business lines between units, part-
ly in an attempt to avoid local rules and oversight, according to bank 
disclosures and people familiar with the matter.17 
In stark contrast, the banks involved invoke efficiency considerations as the 
main motive for converting their  subsidiaries  into branches when they declare a 
simplification of the group structure18 and a more efficient allocation of resources as 
key objectives of the conversion-schemes.19 
1.2.2 UNITED STATES 
Similar concerns were voiced in the aftermath of restructurings that involved 
the U.S.-operations of some global banking-groups headquartered in Europe, to wit 
U.K.’s Barclays and Germany’s Deutsche Bank. The criticized transactions sought to 
avoid the status of a “financial holding company” for the respective groups’ top U.S.-
units under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.20 The critical reform in this 
                                            
16 Regulatory and supervisory competences in international banking are tied to the 
legal entities’ banking licenses, i.e. where a banking group establishes subsidiaries in a mul-
titude of jurisdictions, its operations will require several banking licenses. Hence, several 
regulators and supervisors will be tasked with the group’s supervision and hence have to 
cooperate according to the ground rules laid down under the auspices of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements (BIS), see BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES 
FOR  EFFECTIVE  BANKING  SUPERVISION  40-42 (1997), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf. For a more detailed account see infra 4.1. 
17 Patricia Kowsmann, David Enrich & Laura Stevens, Banks Find New Wrinkle In 
Regulatory Arbitrage, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Dec. 2, 2011, at 1. 
18 For empirical evidence that financial institutions are organized indeed in a signifi-
cantly more complex manner than non-financial firms cf. Richard Herring & Jacopo Car-
massi, The Corporate Structure of International Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and 
Its Implications for Safety & Soundness, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 195-232 
(Allen N. Berger, Phillip Molyneux & John O. S. Wilson, 2012) (showing that the sixteen 
largest financial institutions in the world have 2.5-times more affiliates than the sixteen 
largest non-financial firms) 
19 See  for instance Deutsche Bank, Transformation of Deutsche Bank ZRt. into a 
branch of Deutsche Bank AG  (May 31, 2011)  available at 
https://www.db.com/hungary/docs/Branch_client_communication_letter.pdf. 
20 §2(a)(p) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2012)) define a fi-
nancial holding company as a company that has direct or indirect control over a depository 
banking subsidiary and meets the mandatory capital requirements of §4(l)(1) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012)).  7 
 
regard was promulgated in the course of the Dodd-Frank Act overhaul21 and invari-
ably requires any bank holding company to be well capitalized itself. In particular, 
the tightened legislation cancels the prior leeway to grant exemptions to large in-
termediate  holding companies of  international banking-groups 22 which  may  be 
backed by a strong financial institution outside the U.S. and hence do not necessarily 
depend on own funds to be sufficiently resilient as a stand-alone U.S.-holding com-
pany does. Estimates gauged the additional capital requirements one of the interme-
diate financial holding companies faced under the new regulation at $20 bn.23 The 
rather simple move to avoid this massive burden of having to inject new capital into 
the groups’ U.S.-business  was to  transfer the shares of the wholly owned U.S.-
depository bank from the intermediate holding company to the mother registered 
outside the U.S. As a result, the groups’ U.S. intermediate holding companies were 
left with equity stakes only in subsidiaries that conduct non-depositary financial ac-
tivities. Hence, they no longer fall under the Bank Holding Company Act’s definition 
of a bank holding company.24 
Again, the momentous change in the applicable regulatory and supervisory 
regime could be achieved in an instant without altering the cross-border banking-
groups’ real-world appearance. No wonder, that leading business newspapers unan-
imously regarded the changes in the involved groups’ legal structure as aimed at 
“avoiding” stricter regulation,25 a reputable German daily even characterizing the 
transaction as “tricking” U.S.-supervisors.26 On the other hand, a spokesman of one 
of the banks involved justified the changes as a measure to enhance the efficiency of 
the group’s organizational structure.27 
1.3  MISCONCEPTIONS AND THE PIVOTAL QUESTION 
                                            
21 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Publ. L. No. 111-
203, §606(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1607 (2010). 
22 The substantive regulation is contained in the Federal Reserve’s amendments to 
Regulation Y (12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2012)). They require any large bank holding companies to 
submit capital plans that adhere to rigorous own funds requirements. 
23 David Enrich & Laura Stevens, Deutsche Avoids Dodd-Frank Rule, WALL ST. J., 
March 22, 2012, at C1. 
24 For a detailed description of the transaction cf. David Enrich, Laura Stevens & Al-
exandra Berzon, Deutsche Maneuvers Around New Law, Wall St. J., April 13, 2012, at ▪▪▪. 
25 Tom Braithwaite & Shahien Nasiripour, Deutsche Bank avoids US capital rules, FI-
NANCIAL TIMES, March 22, 2012, at ▪▪▪; Enrich & Stevens, supra note 23. 
26 Moritz Koch, Tricksen mit Taunus, SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, March 23, 2012, at 26. 
For another harsh critique from the perspective of a U.S.-trade union cf. Letter from Marty 
R. Leary, Unitehere!, to Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/August/20110831/R-1425/R-
1425_080411_87623_491541684764_1.pdf. 
27 Cf. Enrich & Stevens, supra note 23 (quoting Deutsche Bank spokesman Duncan 
King as saying that the “action, which does not diminish any of our regulatory oversight, 
allows us to streamline our organizational structure, strengthening an already strong institu-
tion.”).  8 
 
Even though the restructurings delineated above seem obvious cases of regu-
latory arbitrage at first glance, a critique focusing mainly on the circumvention of 
specific substantive rules  still deals with rather peripheral aspects and ultimately 
misses the crucial issue at hand.  
Clearly, stricter requirements regarding subsidiaries’ or the banking-group’s 
own-funds and a design of executives’ compensation packages that rewards sustain-
able growth have been duly identified as mechanisms that can enhance banks’ resil-
ience and do away with detrimental incentives for excessive risk taking.28 However, 
it seems implausible that a strategy geared at avoiding particularly austere national 
regulation promulgated in certain European  countries 29 actually motivated the 
branch-conversions described above. When the restructurings were initiated a gen-
eral tightening and further harmonization of the pertinent E.U.-regimes had already 
become visible on the international horizon and in critical part even arrived prior to 
the closing of the restructurings.30 These were hence inapt to escape from the regu-
lator’s tighter grip in the longer run. 
Similarly, the efforts to avoid the pertinent Dodd-Frank reforms do not neces-
sarily indicate the affected banks’ proclivity to race for laxity at all cost. The pivotal 
                                            
28 How ill-designed executive pay in banks contributed to the financial crisis has been 
broadly analyzed, mostly with regard to the short-term orientation of high-powered incen-
tive schemes (for an account of the broad consensus in this respect cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Jesse Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1917-1919 (2010)) 
but also with regard to more structural issues in the banking sector see e.g. Günther Franke 
& Jan Pieter Krahnen, The Future of Securitization, in: PRUDENT LENDING RESTORED: SECU-
RITIZATION AFTER THE MORTGAGE MELTDOWN 105, 126-139 (Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard Her-
ring & Robert E. Litan eds., 2009) (presenting evidence on how non-negative bonus pay-
ments induce high leverage ratios that increase default-risk and potentially threaten finan-
cial stability); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, GEO. L.J. 
247, 255-274 (2010) (analyzing how equity-based incentive compensation induces a mana-
gerial bet on the bank’s highly levered assets).   
29 For an overview of the European reforms implementing the international consen-
sus on sound compensation practices achieved among the G-20 nations (cf. Financial Stabil-
ity Forum, Principles for Sound Compensation Practices  (April 2, 2009) available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf); for a detailed analysis of 
European practices see Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Economics, Politics, 
and the International Principles for Sound Compensation Practices: an Analysis of Executive 
Pay at European Banks, 64 VAND. L. REV. 431, 454-53, 483-96 (2011). 
30 Parliament and Council Directive 2010/76, As Regards Capital Requirements for 
the Trading Book and for Re-securitisations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration 
Policies, 2010 O.J. (L 329) 3 [hereinafter: CRD III]. Moreover, as is well known, an even 
more fundamental reform, aimed at completely leveling the playing field for E.U.-banks by 
basing prudential supervision on a single, harmonized rulebook is also in the making, see 
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance under-
takings and investment firms in a financial conglomerate, COM(2011) 453 final (July 20, 
2011)  and  Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, 
COM(2011) 452 final (July 20, 2011) [hereinafter: CRD IV Directive and CRD IV Regula-
tion]. 9 
 
fact under the reform legislation, that some international  banks’  organizational 
structure features an intermediate holding corporation that controls the groups’ in-
corporated U.S.-depository banking units ties the massively augmented capital re-
quirements to rather formal aspects. The severely tightened own funds-requisites do 
neither hinge upon the actual risk-structure of the group nor upon its supervisory 
regime. Thus, they outright negate the possibility that the U.S.-intermediate holding 
may benefit from the support of an overseas parent that is itself subject to a rigid 
regime of consolidated banking supervision which also accounts for the risks that 
accrue  from  the U.S.-business  entity.  Seen from this vantage, submitting to the 
Dodd-Frank reforms could also be regarded as generating a windfall profit for the 
U.S.-banking system as a result of a quasi-protectionist legislation that intentionally 
disregards the transnational nature of cross-border banking groups. 
As a consequence, the reproach that transnational banking groups engaged in 
regulatory arbitrage when they restructured their organizations should not be based 
on a narrow analysis that constricts the view on the applicability of specific rules of 
the supervisory regime prior and after the restructurings. Regardless of the merits of 
discrete substantive rules, the more momentous question that should be posed in 
light of the delineated developments is whether the organizational choices of cross-
border banking groups in general are adequately resorbed by the applicable regime 
of prudential supervision in a transnational context. This implies that the superviso-
ry architecture should neither drive opportunistic choices nor hamper an efficient 
organization of transnational banking groups.  
This  article  explores precisely this  fundamental question  against the back-
ground of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. The short sequence of 
financial disasters that were neither prevented nor mitigated in a meaningful way 
under the current E.U.-regime of shared responsibility among Member States de-
bunks significant shortcomings. Recently promulgated and currently proposed re-
forms tackle the deficiencies only in an insufficient manner. This is all the more wor-
rying as the Euro area crisis together with the ramifications and sequels of the Leh-
mann-debacle highlight the importance of effective “normal-times” prudential su-
pervision. The latter is and will remain a key determinant when it comes to enhanc-
ing the resilience of a transnationally intertwined financial system where market 
discipline in its most pristine occurrence as the exit of failing participants is partly 
unavailable.31  
With this in mind, this article outlines relatively easy to implement reforms 
for the supervision of transnational banking-groups in the E.U. that is no longer 
based on legal form but more on the actual risk structure of the pertinent financial 
institutions. It also aims at paying close attention to the economics of public admin-
istration and international relations in allocating competences among national and 
supranational supervisory bodies. Before detailing the own proposition, part 2 of this 
article looks into the relationship between sovereign debt and banking crises that 
drive regulatory reactions to the financial turmoil in the Euro area that inter alia 
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affirm effective prudential supervision as a pivotal element of their implementation. 
In order to arrive at a more informed idea, which determinants apart from a per-
ceived appetite for regulatory arbitrage drive banks’ organizational choices, part 3 
scrutinizes the merits of either a branch or subsidiary structure for the cross-border 
business of financial institutions. In doing so, it also considers the policy-makers per-
spective. The analysis shows that no one size fits all organizational structure is avail-
able and concludes that banks’ choices should generally not be second-guessed, par-
ticularly because they are subject to (some) market discipline. Part 4 describes and 
evaluates how competences in prudential supervision are currently allocated among 
national and supranational supervisory authorities. In order to evaluate the findings 
the appraisal adopts insights form the economics of public administration and inter-
national relations. It argues that the supervisory architecture has to be more aligned 
with bureaucrats’  incentives and that inefficient requirements to cooperate and 
share information should be reduced. Contrary to a widespread perception, shifting 
responsibility to a supranational authority cannot solve all the problems identified. 
Resting on these foundations, part 5 finally sketches an independent solution that 
dwells on far-reaching mutual recognition of national supervisory regimes and allo-
cates competences in line with supervisors’ incentives and the risk inherent in cross-
border banking groups.  
2  THE IMPORTANCE OF MICRO-PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: LESSONS FROM 
THE ONGOING SOVEREIGN DEBT AND  BANKING CRISES IN THE EURO AR-
EA 
Sovereign debt and banking crises frequently correlate in history, a finding 
which confirms the connections delineated in economic theory (2.1). These basic 
insights serve as a starting point that helps understand not only the repercussions 
that the ongoing Euro area crisis exerts on the European banking system but also 
how the calamities in the financial sector impacted on sovereign debtors. Finally, it 
provides the necessary background for conceiving the role of prudential supervision 
of transnational banking-groups as an important component of the European initia-
tives targeted at long-term hazard control (2.2).  
2.1  SOVEREIGN DEBT AND BANKING CRISES THROUGH THE AGES 
2.1.1 HISTORICAL ANECDOTES 
The first documented sovereign debt crisis occurred when most of the munic-
ipalities of the Attic Maritime Association were unable to repay a loan from the De-
los temple (377-373 B.C.).32 But as early as in 1343 A.D. shock waves triggered by a 
sovereign debtor’s woes were sent across Europe when King Edward III of England 
defaulted on his obligations at the largest Florentine banks, sending them into bank-
                                            
32 Max Winkler, Foreign Bonds an Autopsy 22 (1933).  11 
 
ruptcy and thus causing the collapse of an entire financial system.33 The scenario 
reoccurred in 1557 A.D when King Philip II of Spain ruined the powerful merchant 
banks owned by the South German families of the Fugger and Welser.34 Yet, Ger-
mans were not always the bereaved but also the bankrupts: During the 19th century 
German states defaulted five times on their debt, jointly with Austria and Portugal 
outdistancing Greece, which disappointed its lenders four times.35 All these events 
put severe stress on or increased the already existing distress in the banking system 
at least in the immediately affected economies. 
2.1.2 BAIL-OUT RATIONALITY AND MORAL HAZARD 
At the outset, major banking and sovereign debt crises share a critical com-
mon feature because the option to force a failing debtor’s restructuring or resolution 
in bankruptcy does neither constitute a credible scenario for systemically important 
financial Institutions (SIFIs) nor for  sovereign debtors.  Moreover, where outside 
help is foreseeably available, market discipline is dulled and moral hazard occurs.36   
With regard to sovereign debtors, the probability and magnitude of default in 
general does not depend critically on their ability to pay but on their willingness to 
pay: without an executable  enforcement mechanism that  coerces  debt-servicing, 
sovereign debtors will default once the anticipated costs of doing so have become 
lower than the costs of redeeming the obligation.37 Moreover, sovereign debtors alt-
hough by their very nature fiscally independent bodies can rely on outside help 
where other public actors deem their overall economic, social and political costs of 
                                            
33 Meir Kohn, Merchant banking in the medieval and early modern economy  20 
(Dartmouth College, Dept. of Econ. Working Paper 99-05, 1999) available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~mkohn/Papers/99-05.pdf. 
34 id. 
35 Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff & Miguel A. Savastano, Debt Intolerance 
11 (NBER Working Paper 9908, 2003) available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9908. The 
last German default occurred during the 1930s, cf. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZET-
TELMEYER,  DEBT  DEFAULTS AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES  7 (2006); Eduardo 
Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default  44  (IMF Working Paper 
WP/08/238, 2008) available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08238.pdf. 
36 For a general macroeconomic assessment with a special view to the Euro area see 
Jay C. Shambaugh, The Euro´s Three Crisis  24-27  (Brookings Papers on Econ.  Activity, 
2012)  available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2012_spring_bpea_papers/20
12_spring_BPEA_shambaugh.pdf. 
37 Jonathan Eaton, Mark Gersovitz & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The pure theory of country 
risk, 30 EUR. ECON. REV. 481 (1986). While the immediate costs of servicing debt simply 
consist of interest and redemption payments the pertinent costs of default are more com-
plex: the sovereign debtor will be excluded from international financial markets and will 
thus be unable to smooth consumption and face impediments to investments for a certain 
time. The magnitude of these effects obviously depends on the period of exclusion. Yet, 
even after regaining access to international financial markets, risk premiums will be influ-
enced by the sovereign debtor’s prior default. Moreover, further costs are associated with 
the economic downturn that usually accompanies a sovereign default or trade sanctions in 
reaction to it.  12 
 
the default of a sovereign as too high, even though legal restrictions on sovereign 
bail-outs may exist.38  
SIFIs, as private business corporations, on the other hand, are in principle 
subject to insolvency proceedings. Yet, their market exit, by definition, sends ripples 
through the financial system that create incentives for policy-makers to rescue fail-
ing banks, even if the handling of a systemic crisis in the banking sector was con-
sciously left unclear to induce caution and discipline among SIFIs in an atmosphere 
of  “constructive  uncertainty”.  Even though political decisions makers may have 
pledged not to bail-out SIFIs they tend to behave inconsistently over time and will 
take rescue measures in order to prevent  a chain reaction in the banking sector 
which would ultimately lead to its total collapse.39 The latter would precipitate se-
vere negative consequences for the affected economy’s production and employment. 
That is the case, because in a major banking crisis, financial institutions either go 
bankrupt or at least clamp down on loan approvals. Both, the losses of assets dealt to 
institutional and private investors in the former event as well as the decreased num-
ber of loan approvals in the latter inhibit the propensity to invest and decrease con-
sumer demand. Thus, they hinder macroeconomic output.  
At the same time, the economic crunch exacerbates the crisis, as a recession 
makes it harder for sovereign borrowers to service their debt which in turn will put 
banks even deeper into the quagmire. Finally, the political costs are high as well, as 
basically no elected government will survive the economic downturn, the decline in 
household income and the ensuing asset losses.40 On the other hand, the incentives 
to “gamble for resurrection” are high for political actors, particularly because there is 
no external mechanism that can force sovereign debtors to declare insolvency, i.e. to 
apply for loans form the International Monetary Fund or other institutions.  
The anticipation of such time-inconsistencies leads to significant moral hazard 
and excessive risk-taking ex ante. There is an inherent market failure as a conse-
quence of the lack of a predictable insolvency regime which leads to incorrect debt-
pricing. Risk premiums hinge not only on the probability of default but also on the 
probability of declining a bail-out or at least asking for a private sector contribution 
to the rescue efforts. Hence, risk premiums are distorted and the pricing mechanism 
fails to induce adequate risk-taking, i.e. sovereign debtors and SIFIs can borrow too 
cheap, as part of their liability is externalized. Moreover the participation in the loss-
es following the default of a sovereign debtor or a SIFI is attributed on a case by case 
                                            
38 The Founding Treaty of the E.U. explicitly prohibits a bail-out of Member States’ 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by 
public law, or public undertakings, TFEU art. 125(1). However, the massive sovereign bail-
outs in the Euro area were not barred by this constitutional restriction, cf. Jean-Paul Kep-
penne, A Challenge for the Lawyers – Coping with States in Financial Difficulties Within the 
European Union Treaties, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. ▪▪▪ in this issue ▪▪▪ (2012).   
39 For the economics of bailouts see also Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable?, 
29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 123-129 (2012). 
40 For the reasons, why pre-committed politicians will bail-out SIFIs they deem too-
big-to-fail Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: an Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1375-1383 (2011). 13 
 
basis that follows the specific political and institutional preconditions prevailing at 
the time insolvency is declared, and thus can hardly be predicted ex ante, thus 
handicapping a stringent ranking among groups of creditors. As an observable con-
sequence, sovereign debtors – and SIFIs – face relatively low risk premiums for a 
long time but interest rates spike in the vicinity of insolvency.41 Hence a debt crisis 
exhibits the typical elements of a self-fulfilling prophecy where a sudden change in 
market participants’ expectations generates entirely different results although all 
other economic determinants remain unchanged:42 only as long as creditors expect 
other creditors to renew their existing loans or extend even larger ones will they be 
willing to do the same. Investor panic may plunge the debtor into a liquidity crisis, 
as her long-term claims don’t work to cover her short-term liabilities. Where unfa-
vorable refinancing conditions persist, a solvency crisis will ensue. 
Moreover,  bank  bail-outs put tremendous fiscal burdens on the rescuing 
country’s budget,43 which in turn may cast doubts on its ability to service its debt. 
These doubts will lead to a rise in risk premiums and will hence make the country’s 
future debt service even more burdensome. Once again the overall economic devel-
opment (recession) may add to the fiscal hassles. Finally, the sovereign debt crisis 
will backlash on the (national) banking system insofar as banks will typically be the 
main holders of a shaky country’s bonds. Hence their financial stability will be se-
verely impacted if a country declares its insolvency or restructures its debt. This is 
even more so, as sovereign debtors will find it harder or at least more expensive to 
refinance themselves on international financial markets and will consequentially 
have the sovereign debt-load absorbed mainly by domestic banks. The collapse of a 
national banking system will affect the international banking system depending on 
its size and interconnectedness.44 
                                            
41 Mardi Dungey, Renée Fry, Brenda González-Hermosillo & Vance Martin, Interna-
tional Contagion Effects from the Russian Crisis and the LTCM Near-Collapse (April 2002), 
IMF Working Paper No. 02/74, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0274.pdf; Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Isabel 
Schnabel & Jeromin Zettelmayer, How Do Official Bailouts Affect the Risk of Investing in 
Emerging Markets?, 38 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 1689 (2006). 
42 Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983); 
Jeffrey Sachs, Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing  (NBER Working Paper No. 
1189, 1983) available at  http://www.nber.org/papers/w1189.pdf; Paul De Grauwe,  The 
Governing of a Fragile Eurozone  (CEPS Working Paper Nr. 346, 2011) available at 
http://www.ceps.be/ceps/download/5523. 
43 Between October 2008 and May 2010 the 27 Member States of the E.U. spent a to-
tal of €235.1 bn ($288.6 bn) on bank recapitalizations. Guarantees for bonds and other de-
bentures were issued to an amount of €957.7 bn ($1175.7 bn) and further asset support to 
safeguard banks financial stability accounted for the assumption of risk worth €346.5 bn 
($425.4 bn). The pertinent figures for Euro-zone members amounted to €160.1 bn ($196.5 
bn) in recapitalizations,  €735.2 bn ($ 02.6 bn) in guarantees, and €128.7 bn ($ 157.9 bn) in 
risk assumptions, cf. Stéphanie Marie Stolz & Michael Wedow, Extraordinary Measures in 
Extraordinary Times  24  (ECB  Occassional Paper No. 137, 2010)  available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp117.pdf. (Dollar conversions as of May 
31, 2010). 
44 For a theoretical assessment see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk and Global Economic Ar-
chitecture: Why Full Financial Integration May Be Undesirable, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 388 14 
 
2.2  THE CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN ANGLE AND ONE REGULATORY RESPONSE 
The contemporary European  angle of these general  relationships between 
sovereign debt and banking crises followed the general pattern and threatened to 
spin out of control during July 2011 (2.2.1). The events prompted coordinated regu-
latory reactions that highlight the relevance of effective prudential supervision 
(2.2.2).  
2.2.1 CONFIDENCE CRISIS JULY 2011 
The events that occurred during the summer of 2011 elucidate the intercon-
nection between the banking and the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area.45 The 
crisis indicators in the banking sector flashed red alert again when the usually highly 
liquid interbank markets ran dry, U.S. banks and money-market funds withdrew 
their deposits, and the stock prices of European banks declined, while credit default 
swap  spreads climbed. The trigger for the resurging banking troubles was pulled 
when Greece was ostensibly facing the abyss. Rumors had it that the so called troika 
consisting of representatives from the European Commission, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would assess Greece nega-
tively thereby calling into question further fiscal aid and making a ‘voluntary’ write-
off  of private sector  creditors  more likely. Credit rating agencies had already an-
nounced to consider such a ‘voluntary’ participation in Greece’s rescue as a “selec-
tive default” which in turn would have lead the ECB to no longer accept Greek 
bonds as collateral for refinancing purposes sending the largest Greek banks imme-
diately into bankruptcy. Although the severe confidence crisis shaking the whole 
European banking system could be countered by short term measures of hazard con-
trol, the need for more fundamental reactions to eventually reestablish trust in the 
financial sector had become undeniable.  
2.2.2 MICRO-PRUDENTIAL REGULATORY REACTIONS 
On October 26, 2011 European politics reacted to the dwindling confidence in 
the European banking system with far reaching coordinated measures. Inter alia a 
recommendation by the European Banking Authority (EBA)46 sought to tighten rel-
                                                                                                                                        
(2010) (providing an analytical framework that demonstrates the technological conditions 
under which financial autarky is preferable to full integration as the associated risk-sharing 
lowers expected utility). 
45 For a detailed account of the following see GERMAN COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVI-
SORS,  ANNUAL  REPORT  2011/2012  130-134  (2011)  available at 
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Sonstiges/chapter_four_2011.pdf. For a general chro-
nology of the main events during the Euro area crisis id. at 121-122  available at 
http://www.sachverstaendigenrat-
wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/Sonstiges/chapter_three_2011.pdf. 
46 According to Parliament and Council Regulation 1093/2010 (EU) of 24 November 
2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), art. 16, 
2010 O.J. (L 331) 12, 27 [hereinafter: EBA-Regulation] a formal recommendation addressed 
to Member States’ banking supervisors is not legally binding but subject to a comply-or-15 
 
evant micro-prudential regulation to reestablish confidence in SIFIs’ resilience.47 A 
core  capital (Tier 1)48 to risk-weighted  assets ratio49 of 9% should be reached by 
June 30, 2012.50  Furthermore, all banks with a capital shortfall as of September 30, 
2011, according to the EBA’s capital exercise51 had to file a steps plan no later than 
January 20, 2012 which indicated how they would satisfy their capital needs, pri-
marily by raising new capital in private markets and cutting dividends and bonus-
es.52 Finally, an extraordinary buffer for risky sovereign bonds  had to be put in 
place, i.e. the core capital requirement had to be met after the removal of the pru-
dential filter on the sovereign assets in the available-for-sale portfolio and the con-
servative valuation of sovereign debt exposures in the held-to-maturity and loans 
and receivables portfolios, reflecting market prices as of 30 September 2011.53 Banks 
that cannot raise sufficient capital in private markets were to be compulsorily recapi-
talized with public funds from their home Member States who could borrow funds 
at the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) if they became overstrained or 
                                                                                                                                        
explain-mechanism (see also infra 4.2.4.2): the national authority has to declare its non-
compliance within two months after the issuance of the recommendation and communicate 
its reasons to the EBA, which has to publish the fact that the national authority deviates 
from the recommendation and may choose to publish the reasons for doing so, EBA-
Regulation, art. 16(3). 
47EBA, Recommendation of 8 December 2011 on the creation and supervisory over-
sight of temporary capital buffers to restore market confidence, available at http://stress-
test.eba.europa.eu/capitalexercise/EBA%20BS%202011%20173%20Recommendation%20
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter EBA-Recommendation]. 
48 The definition of Core Tier 1 is based on existing E.U.-legislation in the Capital Re-
quirements Directive, see infra at note 137. This definition of capital comprises the highest 
quality capital instruments (common equity) and hybrid instruments provided by govern-
ments. It strips out other hybrid instruments including existing preferred stock. 
49 The risk-weighting of assets means that a bank’s assets and its off-balance sheet 
exposure are valued according to the risk of depreciations. Asset-classes with lower risk of 
devaluation can be deducted accordingly, the simplest example being a riskless (0%-
possibility of deprecation) asset that can be deducted entirely from a bank’s risk-weighted 
assets.  
50 Generally for the significance of capital requirements in reducing systemic risk see 
Hal S. Scott, Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation, 13 J. Int'l 
Econ. L. 763, 764 (2010). 
51 The EBA ultimately calculated the capital shortfall of all relevant European banks 
in its recapitalization exercise at €114 bn ($186 bn), cf.  EBA Communication of 8 December 
2011 available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/News--Communications/Year/2011/The-EBA-
publishes-Recommendation-and-final-results.aspx. However, in June 2012 Spain acquiesced 
to a bailout package of €100 bn ($125 bn) to rescue its banks alone made these estimates 
crumble away soon, see Charles Forelle & Gabriele Steinhauser, Latest Europe Rescue Aims 
to Prop Up Spain, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2012 at A1. The dependence on the methodology 
was already illustrated by the earlier estimations of the German Council of Economic Ex-
perts that based their gauges on the balance sheet positions published by the EBA in July 
2011: the capital shortfall of European banks would amount to €106 bn ($150 bn) if a 
write-down of 50% was applied to Greek bonds. If a mark-to-market approach was applied 
to all sovereign debt-positions, allowing for both depreciations and appreciations, the capital 
shortfall of European banks would rise to €137 bn ($194 bn), GERMAN COUNCIL OF ECONOM-
IC EXPERTS supra note 45 at 132.  
52 EBA-Recommendation at 13-14. 
53 EBA-Recommendation at 13. 16 
 
were put under severe pressure by financial markets as a consequence of such recap-
italizations. 
Even though significant steps to enhance the regulatory framework for SIFIs 
and reestablish market discipline have been taken in the meantime, 54 micro-
prudential regulation will constitute a pivotal building block in the attempts to erect 
a stable and sustainable structure for the financial sector in the E.U. It is thus of criti-
cal importance to ensure an effective administration of these rules. Clearly, with the 
supervisory structure depending on a transnational banking group’s legal structure,55 
organizational choices of banks impact on the administration of these rules which is 
why the next part turns to the basic characteristics of the available alternatives in 
order to evaluate the driving forces behind banks’ pertinent decisions.  
3  ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES OF BANKS 
This part briefly reviews the most important characteristics of the organiza-
tional structures prevalent in cross-border banking (3.1).56 Benefits and detriments 
associated with either the branch- or the subsidiary model are rather scattered so 
that neither structure dominates over the other from the banks’ (3.2) or the policy-
makers’ (3.3) perspective. The findings corroborate the posit that the simple allega-
tion of regulatory arbitrage underestimates the complexity of the choice of organiza-
tional form and misdirects the attention away from the central issue of how pruden-
tial supervision can best serve its end regardless of the legal structure banks opt for 
in their cross-border operations  (3.4).  
3.1  BRANCHES AND SUBSIDIARIES: MAIN  FEATURES OF PROTOTYPICAL ORGANIZA-
TIONAL STRUCTURES 
In an ideal world, the branch-structure under which all foreign operations are 
conducted from within a single legal entity, allows for a centralized organization 
where capital and liquidity flow freely across business units and across borders.57 
Capital is raised in the market where it is least expensive and deployed where it 
yields the highest return, thus offering cost-reducing arbitrage options across juris-
dictions. In times of crisis, the integrated risk management can move excess capital 
and liquidity that is available anywhere within the group to the business unit under 
stress.  
                                            
54 Most notably the Commission Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive es-
tablishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 
2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) 
No 1093/2010, COM (2012) 280 final (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Proposal Resolution Di-
rective] that aims at establishing a cross-border resolution regime for SIFIs and a viable bail-
in mechanism and thus goes to the heart of the moral hazard problem (supra 2.1.2) in the 
banking sector. 
55 For a detailed analysis see infra 4. 
56 See already supra 1.1. 
57 The closest real world example of such an idealized branch-structure occurs in the 
E.U. see infra 4.2.1.2.  17 
 
On the other hand, opting for an archetypical subsidiary-structure  under 
which foreign business units are legally independent, incorporated entities, entails 
decentralized operations subject to local capital and liquidity requirements.  Legal 
restrictions on the transfer of capital and liquidity hamper respective  intra-group 
transactions, whereas the transfer of knowledge and technology is by and large un-
impeded. Parent and subsidiaries are subject to the sufficient own funds and liquidi-
ty requirements of local jurisdictions. Individual risk-management of the group’s 
entities is required to make them resilient as stand-alone as in times of crisis finan-
cial aid is guaranteed neither from the parent nor from any other group-affiliate. In 
fact, capital maintenance requirements in corporate law serve as a (weak) form of 
ring-fencing58 which raises the operating costs of the transnational banking-group 
that requires overall higher levels of capital.59   
It has to be noted here that for the purpose of analysis simplifications are use-
ful, although reality is significantly more complex. For instance, on a regulatory lev-
el, some jurisdictions treat (foreign) branches and subsidiaries alike when it comes to 
capital and liquidity requirements for the hosted business unit.60 As will be discussed 
in more detail, 61 this is only one example where the  legal differences  between 
branch- and subsidiary-model that are clear-cut at the outset are significantly leveled 
with regard to micro-prudential supervision. 
3.2  THE BANK’S PERSPECTIVE 
3.2.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
                                            
58 Usually, the term signifies a separation of business units that aims at limiting the 
risk of contagion without proscribing their consolidation under the roof of a single financial 
institution, Julian T.S. Chow & Jay Surti, Making Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do 
It?  22-23 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/11/236, 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11236.pdf. The most prominent proposal 
in this direction comes from a U.K.-commission and seeks to shield (domestic) retail opera-
tions from the risks of (international) investment banking without prohibiting that these 
lines of business be organizationally united within a so called universal bank that arguably 
attains diversification benefits, see  INDEPENDENT  COMMISSION ON BANKING,  FINAL  REPORT 
RECOMMENDATIONS  35-77, 76-77 (2011) (U.K.) available at 
http://bankingcommission.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ICB-Final-
Report.pdf. 
59 Cf. Eugenio Cerutti, Anna Ilyina,Yulia Makarova & Christian Schmieder, Bankers 
Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks  (Int’l 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/10/247, 2011) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1750736 (devising a stylized model that 
indicates that cross-border banking groups need larger capital buffers at the subsidiary and 
parent level under ring-fencing to survive a credit shock). 
60 Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 7 note 4. 
61 Infra 3.4. 18 
 
The principal characteristics of the organizational options translate into costs 
and benefits for a banking group that seeks to optimize the legal structure of its 
cross-border business.62  
Intuitively, a branch structure entails lower costs of doing business for the 
banking-group  compared to  operating under  a subsidiary-structure.  Independent 
legal personality in principle requires subsidiaries to sustain themselves as stand-
alone  entities and thus leads to a need  for  higher capital-  and liquidity buffers. 
Moreover, the latter have to be filled at higher lending costs for the individual enti-
ties.63 The pertinent restrictions on the transfer of capital and liquidity attenuate op-
portunities for arbitrage when capital is raised and deployed under a subsidiary 
structure. 
Furthermore, the branch structure can strengthen the group’s resilience if lo-
cally contained, adverse developments occur. Obviously, the latter constitutes an 
advantage from the bank’s perspective if the group’s survival in its current structure 
is deemed desirable.64 The unimpeded transfer of funds allows overcoming country 
specific negative shocks, as long as the magnitude of the adverse developments does 
not consume the group’s entire capital and liquidity reserves. On the other hand, 
legal restrictions that can result from general corporate law (e.g. minimum capital 
requirements65) as well as specific regulations applying to banks66 may hamper the 
quick transfer of much needed funds under a subsidiary structure.67  
                                            
62 For a more detailed discussion of the following see Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, 
Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
63 For some empirical evidence corroborating the general posit cf. Ata Can Bertay, 
Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Is the financial safety net a barrier to cross-border 
banking?  (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.  5947, 2012) available at 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/01/17/000158349_2012011
7092544/Rendered/PDF/WPS5947.pdf (showing that the cost of funds increase by 1.5% to 
2.4% if they are raised through a foreign subsidiary compared to domestic banks).  
64 For evidence, that international bank’s retained their presence –  subsidiaries 
though – despite a severe downturn in central and southern European economies, see Bo-
nin supra note 4. 
65 For instance, European legislation prohibits any corporation to distribute funds if 
its net assets are or would through such distribution drop below the amount of the sub-
scribed capital established in the corporate charter, Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 
13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests 
of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of 
the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited 
liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to mak-
ing such safeguards equivalent, art. 15, 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1. 
66 See already supra 2.2.2.  
67 A group of experts assigned by the European Commission identified a multitude of 
restrictions on intra-group transfers that can form an obstacle to containing a banking crisis 
and thus proposed to lift these barriers under certain conditions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF REDUCING OBSTACLES TO THE TRANSFER OF ASSETS WITHIN A CROSS 
BORDER BANKING GROUP DURING A FINANCIAL CRISIS 7 (proposal No. 1), 31-113 (2011) avail-
able at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/windingup/200908/final_report20091218_e19 
 
Conversely, however, the subsidiary structure may facilitate the containment 
of losses that accrue at a single group unit. The crisis or even the bankruptcy of a 
battered, legally independent affiliate or of the parent corporation as a matter of 
principle does not affect the going concern of other group entities.68  
3.2.2 ASSETS AND DRAWBACKS DEPENDING ON THE BANK’S BUSINESS MODEL 
Some advantages accrue depending on the business model the banking-group 
intends to pursue in its transnational expansion.69 The branch structure allows cor-
porate clients to borrow against the entire group’s (global) balance sheet and hence 
to push large exposure limits70 and to improve borrowing conditions. 
On the other hand, (only) the subsidiary structure allows to access local de-
posit insurance schemes71 and thus to appeal to consumer confidence if the latter is 
rooted in a larger faith in domestic institutions.72 Moreover, the advantages of a cen-
tralized liquidity- and risk-management may be smaller if the business model is fo-
                                                                                                                                        
n.pdf. The Commission intends to follow the expert advice cf. Proposal Resolution Directive 
artt. 17-23. 
68 For a review of the empirical literature that indicates under which conditions 
banks retain their presence through subsidiaries in transition economies even in times of 
crisis, see P. Bonin, supra note 4 (arguing that the acquisition of a majority stake during the 
privatization of formerly state-owned banks accounts for a long-term commitment).  
69 For a broader discussion of the following issues cf. Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, 
Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
70 In order to allow for a reasonable diversification, micro-prudential regulation of 
banks restricts the permissible concentration of credit risk by setting a limit on how much a 
single counter-party can borrow from the bank, i.e. large exposure limits relate the maxi-
mum that is available for lending to a single borrower to the bank’s total capital base, see 
generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MEASURING AND CONTROLLING LARGE 
CREDIT EXPOSURES 5 (1991) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc121.pdf.  
71 For example, under current European legislation, credit institutions, i.e. incorpo-
rated entities, are covered by the Member State’s guarantee scheme that issued their bank-
ing license with the institution’s branches included in the pertinent national system, Di-
rective 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on depos-
it-guarantee schemes, art. 3(1), 4(1), 1994 O.J. (L 135)  5. For a similar best practice rec-
ommendation see BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION & INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF  DEPOSIT  INSURERS,  CORE  PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE  DEPOSIT  INSURANCE  SYSTEMS  3, 12 
(2009) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs156.pdf.   
72 The Euro area crisis serves as a reminder that this need not be the case, with de-
positors from the troubled Member States at least engaging in a ‘bank jog’ in which they 
transfer their funds to foreign banks as a consequence of their mistrust in local guarantee 
schemes, cf. Noémie Bisserbe, Greek Banks Under Pressure, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2012 at 
A1. See also the Belgian press echo to Deutsche Bank’s branch-conversion that pointed to 
improvements for retail customers that came under the protection of the (limitless) German 
depositor guarantee scheme as a consequence of the intra-group restructurings (see supra 
1.2.1), P.D-D,  Protection sans plafond,  LA  LIBRE, Oct. 15, 2011 available at 
https://www.deutschebank.be/media/pdf/presse-libre-protection-sans-plafond-15-10-
2011.pdf; F.M., Les clients belges de Deutsche Bank protégés… en Allemagne, L’ECHO, Oct. 
15, 2011, available at  https://www.deutschebank.be/media/pdf/presse-echo-clients-
proteges-15-10-2011.pdf. 20 
 
cused on retail clients where local fund-raising and a deepened understanding of 
local markets seems more important.73  
3.2.3 BUSINESS JUDGMENT AND MARKET REACTIONS  
The noteworthy aspect of this brief overview – which does not aim at ex-
hausting the subject74 –  lies  in the observation that both the subsidiary and the 
branch-structure support business models that cannot be regarded as abusive or op-
portunistic, an observation that becomes even more stringent if the policy-maker’s 
perspective is taken into account  in more detail.75 Ultimately, the organizational 
choices  seem to hinge upon the context-dependent  business judgment  of cross-
border banks’ decision-makers  because no model clearly dominates the other in 
terms of effectiveness and practicality.76 
After all, some market discipline can be expected at least with regard to pal-
pably opportunistic choices. Although SIFIs do not face the terminal sanction of a 
forced market exit in bankruptcy,77 their creditors face at least uncertainty and po-
tentially losses on the nominal value of their claims in the event of financial distress. 
As a consequence, it is plausible that a bank’s choice of an inferior regime of pru-
dential regulation and supervision will have a negative impact on its prospects.78 The 
mounting mistrust in certain countries’ deposit guarantee schemes and the general 
public  alertness  vis-à-vis  the  details of such schemes supports this notion.79 Fur-
thermore, there is robust evidence that markets are sensitive with regard to the ef-
fectiveness of public enforcement of the regulatory framework designed to protect 
their interest. Admittedly, with regard to banking supervision, this can only be ex-
                                            
73 See Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 10, 22 (at-
tributing the organizational structure of Spanish cross-border banking to its retail-customer 
orientation).  
74 An in-depth analysis identifies further determinants that account for the organiza-
tional choices in transnational banking and points to (i) the treatment of branches and sub-
sidiaries in tax law in the home as well as in the host jurisdiction, (ii) the development and 
the structure of the foreign markets which may or may not provide sufficient opportunities 
to source capital, and (iii) macroeconomic and political risks abroad which may less severely 
affect branches than locally incorporated subsidiaries, Cerutti, Dell’Ariccia & Martínez Pería, 
supra note 13, at 1685-1691 (scrutinizing the world’s 100 largest banks’ operations in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe). 
75 Infra 3.3. 
76 For a similar assessment INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 3, at 9. 
77 On the underlying too big to fail/too interconnected to fail dilemma supra 2.1.2. 
78 Generally on (sophisticated) debt-holders significant sensitivity to bank risk e.g. 
Andrea Sironi, Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence 
from Subordinated Debt Issues, 35 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 443-472 (2003) (showing 
sensitivity to bank-risk among investors in subordinated notes and debentures); for the con-
temporary approaches to measuring credit risk see Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks 
Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 311-322 (2012). 
79 See supra note 72. For robust empirical evidence Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & 
Sergio L. Schmukler, Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, De-
posit Insurance, and Banking Crises, 56 J. FIN. 1029 (2001) (showing how depositors disci-
plined weak banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates in Argen-
tina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s). 21 
 
trapolated from certain studies that establish markets’ general capacity to assess 
available information on banks’ default risk correctly even in times of crisis.80 How-
ever, if prudential regulation is at least potentially suited to mitigate the risk of bank 
failure, creditors should be attuned to its quality and enforcement. And it is precisely 
such awareness of market participants that has been particularly well documented 
with regard to the enforcement of investor protecting securities laws.81 As a conse-
quence, choosing “bad” prudential supervision should be penalized by credit mar-
kets which hence serve as a counterbalance to opportunistic choices.82 It can be jus-
tified on these grounds to accept banks’ organizational choices and design the super-
visory regime accordingly instead of cramming them into certain structures in cross-
border banking by alleging maneuvers of regulatory arbitrage. 
3.3  THE POLICYMAKER’S PERSPECTIVE 
To have the full picture, the policy-maker’s  view  on transnational banks’ 
choices between the branch- and the subsidiary model must be assessed. The critical 
issues from the vantage of a cross-border bank’s home and host country seem to be 
the relative growth perspectives under either organizational model and their respec-
tive impact on financial stability.83 Once again, however, the findings remain ambig-
uous.  
Intuitively, a growth-hungry policy-maker should prefer to see transnational 
banks to branch into her economy as the branch model potentially grants easier ac-
cess to credit.84 Yet, the empirical evidence with very successful transition economies 
being served through subsidiaries of large international banks casts doubt on the ex-
                                            
80 John S. Jordan, Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, The Market Reaction to the Disclo-
sure of Supervisory Actions: Implications for Bank Transparency, 9 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 
298, 307-317 (2000) (showing how increased disclosure of supervisory actions even during 
a banking crisis in the U.S. had no destabilizing effect but contributed to a more effective 
allocation of resources in the U.S. banking sector). 
81 For recent empirical papers see John Armour, Colin Mayer & Andrea Polo, Regula-
tory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets (Oxford Legal Studies Res. 
Paper No. 62/2010, 2010) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1678028 (finding that fines 
administered by public enforcement agencies serve as a clear signal to the market that mo-
mentously punishes wrongdoers); Howell Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private En-
forcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. Fin. Econ. 207 (2009) (estab-
lishing the correlation between public enforcement of securities laws and market develop-
ment). 
82 For a more pessimistic view in light of the financial crisis but underestimating the 
significance of unknown supervisory deficits and palpable opportunism Joel P. Trachtman, 
The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Coop-
eration, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 719, 723-25 (2010). 
83 For an extensive discussion and review of the literature regarding the effect of 
cross-border banking on financial stability cf. FRANKLIN ALLEN, THORSTEN BECK, ELENA CAR-
LETTI, PHILIP R. LANE, DIRK SCHOENMAKER & WOLF WAGNER, CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EU-
ROPE: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES  47-53 (2011). 
See also Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 15-17. 
84 For the underlying reasons see supra 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 22 
 
istence of such a clear-cut preference.85 Moreover, if the subsidiary structure ham-
pers the intra-group transfer of funds and hence compels to rely more on local de-
posits,86 it can contribute to the development of credit markets in host countries. 
Yet, as has already been mentioned, where savings are limited due to market devel-
opment, large exposure limits may quickly preclude corporate clients form borrow-
ing form local subsidiaries87 and in turn coerce these actors into bypassing local cred-
it markets thus handicapping their development.88 
The competing organizational models’ influence on financial stability reveals a 
dichotomy of interests between the banks’ host- and home countries. Assuming that 
the subsidiary model allows containing local crises,89 greater resilience should result 
with regard to individual group members, if the shock is external. Conversely, under 
the branch model the readily available, group-wide support90 should make it easier 
to weather the storm if the crisis has a domestic source. However, saving a foreign 
business unit puts stress on the banking group. As a result, policy-makers will be 
reserved with regard to rescue obligations that originate abroad but weaken the in-
stitution and entail the risk of contagion.91 Policy-makers in a banking group’s home 
country will thus prefer a subsidiary structure, if the financial crisis arises abroad, 
and will welcome a branch structure if foreign entities shall contribute to averting a 
crisis in the group’s home country. The host country agenda is diametrical.  
This stark contrast of interest only varies in degree, if a failing bank has to be 
rescued with public funds. Absent transnational burden-sharing arrangements92 host 
countries are under no obligation to participate in bail-outs under the branch-model, 
whereas home countries do not have to contribute to the rescue of a foreign incor-
porated affiliate under the subsidiary model.93 
Clearly, from the perspective of those responsible for public policy there is no 
abstract preference for either organizational structure. This is particularly true once 
                                            
85 Ralph de Haas & Iman van Lelyveld, Internal capital markets and lending by mul-
tinational bank subsidiaries, 19 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 10-16 (2010) (finding evidence for 
the existence of internal capital markets that allow subsidiaries of financially strong parents 
to expand their lending faster than domestic competitors). However, for evidence to the 
contrary see supra note 4. See also supra note 68. 
86 Supra 3.2.2. 
87 Supra 3.2.2. 
88 Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 15. 
89 Supra 3.2.1. 
90 Supra 3.2.1. 
91 Supra 1.1. 
92 It is a critical feature of the recent reform initiatives in the E.U. that such risk-
sharing agreements will be concluded among the Member States involved in a bail-out of a 
transnational financial institution, cf. Proposal Resolution Directive art. 98. For a discussion 
of various models of ex post and ex ante agreements Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmak-
er,  Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises, 5 INT’L J. CENTRAL BANK. 141 
(2009). 
93 From the vantage of a (small) country that is the domicile of large international 
banking groups but has only confined fiscal firepower, it may be prudent to encourage a 
subsidiary structure. For a correspondent recommendation cf. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra 
note 3, at 23. 23 
 
policy considerations are not ruthlessly confined to national interests: where a polity 
reaps all the social gains from a branch’s successful operations it seems hard to justi-
fy and creates a free-rider problem if it is in fact under no obligation to contribute to 
alleviating distress originating at this very entity. 
3.4  THE REGULATORY ARBITRAGE DEBATE REVISITED 
This brief survey indicates that neither from the banks’ nor from the policy-
makers’ perspective one organizational model dominates the other.  Importantly, 
many effects identified as core features of either organizational model can be molded 
in practice to a significant degree. For instance, centralized group financing and li-
quidity management typically involves independently incorporated affiliates, i.e. 
with qualified corporate and accounting counsel capital flows are largely independ-
ent of the group’s legal structure. Similarly, group-wide guarantees, letters of com-
fort etc. may create liability risks although the originally chosen subsidiary structure 
created firewalls between business units. The latter can also be undone if looming 
negative reputational effects of an affiliate’s failure de facto  compel its support. 
Hence, it takes no wonder that in practice rather complex organizational hybrids can 
be observed, mainly as a function of the cross-border banks’ business models.94  
All this affirms the perception that banks’ organizational choices in their 
cross-border business cannot easily be identified as serving or militating against so-
cial welfare.95 In general, they should hence be acquiesced, not least because banks 
will have to live with a variety of consequences other than their choices’ impact on 
the regulatory framework. As a consequence the attention of policy-makers should 
be turned to designing a supervisory architecture that achieves its stated goal of min-
imizing the probability and consequences of financial distress in the banking sector 
regardless of banks’ organizational choices. 
With this in mind, an important consequence of the discussion should not go 
unnoted. As polities are affected in different ways by the financial distress of inde-
pendently incorporated or legally dependent business units of a transnational 
bank,96 their incentives in micro-prudential supervision diverge accordingly. If fail-
ure of an affiliate or branch does not affect the supervisor’s economy, she will only 
have low-powered incentives to engage in preventive efforts. On the other hand, if 
the viability of the respective business units impacts on the economy, public policy 
has reasons to seek influence in their prudential supervision and execute it ade-
quately. This observation is important, because it indicates that charging authorities 
with responsibilities creates an externality problem if the benefits from reducing the 
risk of failure or the damages from doing so suboptimally accrue in foreign econo-
mies. These external effects get exacerbated if the allocation of supervisory compe-
                                            
94 For rich data compiled from central banks, supervisory, and regulatory authorities 
see Fiechter, Ötker-Robe, Ilyina, Hsu, Santos & Surti, supra note 1, at 13-14. See also supra 
note 18. 
95 See already supra 3.2.3. 
96 Supra 3.3. 24 
 
tence prevents authorities from contributing to micro-prudential efforts even though 
their economies are massively affected. 
Dwelling on these observations, the following part of this article turns to the 
supervisory regime for E.U. transnational banking groups. It explains which short-
comings contributed to the current banking-crisis and why the attempts to remedy 
the problems identified may be only a half-hearted step into the right direction. 
4  THE SUPERVISORY REGIME FOR E.U. CROSS-BORDER BANKING-GROUPS 
Public supervision of banks generally constitutes a reserve of sovereign coun-
tries which requires at least some division of labor once banks expand their business 
across borders. However, organizational choices affect the institutional setup in a 
significant manner: where an international banking-group opts for the subsidiary 
model, host country supervisors get more clout in the cooperative game as the sepa-
rate legal entity has to be furnished with a domestic license and is thus supervised by 
host country authorities, whereas under a branch structure host-country watchdogs 
are largely deemed to remain idle.97 
Tying the whole supervisory regime to the referred distinction seems some-
what stuck in 19th-century formalism. Moreover, it stands in stark contrast to the 
efforts made elsewhere in current banking law to gear micro-prudential supervision 
towards the actual risk posed by the regulated institution’s business.98 To bolster this 
argument, the general determinants of the division of competences between the na-
tional supervisors involved will be outlined (4.1) before turning to the E.U.-regime 
in more detail (4.2) and evaluating the findings (4.3). 
4.1  GENERAL DETERMINANTS 
A basic concept for the effective supervision of cross-border banking-groups 
was laid out in the Basel Concordat99 and later transformed into rather lofty ground 
rules in the Basel Core Principles (BCP)100 devised by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (BCBS) at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
BCP 23 obliges home country supervisors of internationally active banking 
groups to “practise global consolidated supervision over their internationally active 
banking organisations, adequately monitoring and applying appropriate prudential 
norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banking  organisations 
worldwide, primarily at their foreign branches, joint ventures and subsidiaries.”101 
                                            
97 For a detailed account see infra 4.2. 
98 For this overall end of the substantive rules under the so called Basel II- and Basel 
III-Accords see infra 4.2.4.1. 
99 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision & Offshore Group of Banking Supervi-
sors, The Supervision of Cross-Border Banking (1996)  available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs27.pdf. 
100 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (1997) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf. 
101 Id., at 40. 25 
 
Furthermore, BCP 24 underlines that a “key component of consolidated supervision 
is establishing contact and information exchange with the various other supervisors 
involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities.” Correspondingly, pursu-
ant to BCP 25 host country supervisors “must have powers to share information 
needed by the home country supervisors of those banks for the purpose of carrying 
out consolidated supervision.”102 
It is worth noting that the pertinent Section of the BCP underscores the im-
portance of unconfined cooperation between home and host country authorities and 
at this juncture does not distinguish between the different organizational structures 
of cross-border banks. 
4.2  THE E.U.-ARCHITECTURE OF MICRO-PRUDENTIAL BANKING SUPERVISION 
The European regulatory framework responds to the BCP and transforms 
them into supranational law that binds E.U. Member States.103 To this end, suprana-
tional law makes rather detailed prescripts when it comes to delineating national 
authorities competences that leave Member States little to no latitude in implement-
ing the pertinent Directive. With regard to cross-border banking groups, European 
law frames an elaborate regime that governs both, the monitoring of individual 
business entities (4.2.1) and the consolidated supervision of the whole group (4.2.2). 
In that, it makes a pivotal distinction between subsidiaries and branches. In general, 
the supervisory architecture requires a relatively high degree of cooperation and the 
constant exchange of information between national authorities. The necessary coor-
dination shall generally be facilitated by colleges of supervisors (4.2.3) as well as su-
pranational authorities established on the E.U.-level where most-recently initiated 
reforms will significantly alter the scenario (4.2.4).  
4.2.1 SUPERVISION OF BUSINESS ENTITIES  
The prudential supervision of individual business entities is linked directly to 
the authorization of the pertinent activities: the competent authority that granted 
the banking license is responsible for the institutions ongoing supervision (4.2.1.1), 
i.e. where cross-border activities require no separate authorization, national banking 
supervision encompasses permanent activities on foreign markets (4.2.1.2).  
4.2.1.1 SUBSIDIARIES  
Independently incorporated business entities of a cross-border banking group 
constitute themselves “credit institutions” within the scope of the pertinent suprana-
tional regulation104 and hence have to be authorized by the Member State of incor-
                                            
102 Id. 
103 The relevant European Directive (infra note 104) prescribes to which ends and to 
what extent national laws shall be harmonized and obliges Member States to implement the 
specifications in their domestic legislation, TFEU art. 288(2). 
104 Directive 2006/48 of the European Parliament and the Council relating to the tak-
ing up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions, art. 4(1)(13), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 26 
 
poration.105 As a consequence these home Member States assume the primary re-
sponsibility for the pertinent institutions’ prudential supervision regardless of their 
group-affiliation.106  
The necessary coordination and cooperation among multiple supervisory au-
thorities that are simultaneously tasked with controlling the cross-border banking-
groups’ affiliates incorporated in different jurisdictions is supposed to be achieved on 
a macro-level within the European Financial Supervisory System and, for Europe’s 
largest banks, on the micro-level within Colleges of Supervisors.107  
This supervision of individual credit institutions which at the outset considers 
each independently incorporated deposit institution as a stand-alone is complement-
ed by the consolidated supervision of the whole group that represents a duty of the 
competent authority that authorized the parent institution.108  
4.2.1.2 BRANCHES (E.U.-PASSPORT) 
Banking-Directive art. 40(1) [CRD IV Directive art. 49 (1)] refers to Banking-
Directive art. 23 [CRD IV Directive art. 33] and thus indicates expressly that pruden-
tial supervision of a credit institution encompasses the cross-border activities carried 
out through a branch or the direct provision of services.109 Correspondingly, Banking 
Directive art. 16 [CRD IV Directive art. 17] prohibits host Member States to require a 
separate authorization or to prescribe a specific capital endowment for the branches 
of those credit institutions that received a banking license from their home Member 
State. This regulatory framework warrants describing the banking license of the in-
corporated credit institution as a “European passport”.110 In fact, the latter allows 
credit institutions to “travel” on their domestic banking authorizations throughout 
the E.U.  without significant restrictions.  Transnational credit institutions merely 
have to notify host Member States’ authorities prior to commencing their cross-
border activities, with the depth of required disclosures varying between branch es-
tablishment and provision of services.111  
As home Member States’ competent authorities almost completely predomi-
nate in the prudential supervision of cross-border activities carried out through 
branches, host Member States’ authorities are confined to providing information to 
                                                                                                                                        
[hereinafter Banking Directive]. The allocation of competences is supposed to remain un-
touched in its substance under the Proposed CRD IV legislation (supra at note 30). The fol-
lowing refers to the CRD IV equivalents of the Banking Directive in square brackets.    
105 Banking Directive artt. 6 et seq [CRD IV Directive artt. 9 et seq]. 
106 Cf. Banking Directive artt. 40(1), 4(7). The system will remain intact under CRD 
IV Directive, art. 49(1), CRD IV Regulation art. 4(61). 
107 Cf. infra 4.2.4.2. 
108 Banking Directive art. 40(2); same CRD IV Directive art. 49(2). Cf. infra 4.2.2. 
109 See supra note 12. 
110 Cf. Banking Directive artt. 23, 25 et seq. ; for the basically identical rules of the 
proposed legislation cf. CRD IV Directive artt. 33, 35 et seq.  
111 Banking Directive artt. 25 et seq., 28. Same in CRD IV Directive artt. 35 et seq., 
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facilitate home Member State supervision, although the duty to cooperate under 
Banking Directive art. 42 [CRD IV Directive artt. 146, art. 51 (1)] is by design a mu-
tual obligation. The home Member States’ competent authorities are even author-
ized to conduct on-site-examinations, i.e. act in a sovereign capacity on foreign terri-
tory in order to obtain information pertinent to their supervisory activities that were 
not adequately supplied by host Member States’ watchdogs.112 
After all, the competent authority of a branch’s host Member State retains the 
responsibility for inter alia the supervision of the branch’s liquidity.113 However, the-
se functions have to be exercised in cooperation with the home Member State’s 
competent authority in accordance with the procedures laid out in Banking Di-
rective art. 30:114 The host Member State’s authority may require a branch to im-
prove on its liquidity endowment but has to turn to the home Member State’s su-
pervisor in case the credit institution does not comply voluntarily. Only if the home 
Member State’s authority fails to put an end to the branch’s irregular situation may 
the host Member State’s supervisor step in and enforce the required measures di-
rectly vis-à-vis the foreign credit institution.  
4.2.2 CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION 
As recommended by the BCP115 a core feature of the European regulatory 
framework is consolidated supervision of the group. The prominence of this type of 
monitoring  reflects the accurate  perception, that even though  the transnational 
banking group is comprises of legally independent affiliates (incorporated parents 
and subsidiaries) it represents a business unit that is economically integrated and 
hence poses a variety of risks that warrants a comprehensive micro-prudential view 
on the group’s operations.116   
                                            
112 For details see Banking Directive art. 43(1); CRD IV Directive art. 53(1). 
113 Banking Directive art. 41 which also grants host Member State’s authorities the 
necessary competences to implement national monetary policy where the latter is inde-
pendent [until January 1, 2015 CRD IV Directive art. 145 shall contain an identical rule, (cf. 
CRD IV Directive art. 140. Yet, the latter will be replaced by the more complex regime in 
CRD IV artt. 41, 43 that, except for emergency situations, gives host Member States general-
ly less clout in monitoring a branch’s liquidity as they can no longer act vis-à-vis the foreign 
branch but only induce the home Member State competent authority to take action or ap-
peal to the EBA to settle a dispute]. Under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) the host Member States competent authority is also tasked with supervising the 
proper business conduct of the branch, Directive 2004/39 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, art. 32(7), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 26.  
114 Until January 1, 2015 CRD IV Directive art. 142 which will give way to the divi-
sion of labor outlined in CRD IV Directive artt. 41, 43 that give home Member States (and 
the EBA) a stronger position, see supra note 113. 
115 Supra 4.1. 
116 Typical issues are the risk of intra-group contagion that is not necessarily limited 
to scenarios where the original shield of limited liability that protects incorporated affiliates 
from financial distress at other group-members has been undone, e.g. by a binding letter of 
comfort. It can also occur if, even without direct mutual financial exposure, negative infor-
mation on specific group members corrupts the confidence of creditors in other affiliates. 
Similar problems may occur if the group members’ respective exposure to certain counter-28 
 
According to Banking Directive art. 125(1) [CRD IV Directive art. 106 (1)] 
consolidated supervision  is exercised by the competent authority of the Member 
State that authorized the parent credit institution of a cross-border banking group.117 
Banking Directive art. 126 [CRD IV Directive art. 106 (3)-(6)] aims at a similar con-
centration of competence for consolidated supervision of a group’s credit institutions 
if the head of the banking-group itself is not a credit institution (which accepts de-
posits) but provides any of an array of financial services and is thus deemed to be a 
E.U. financial holding company.118 The latter may in turn be included in consolidat-
ed supervisory activities pursuant Banking Directive art. 127 [CRD IV Directive art. 
114].  
Moreover, consolidated  supervision also affects the supervision of a cross-
border banking group’s subsidiaries and restricts the leeway for autonomous deci-
sion making of Member State’s supervisors that authorized affiliated credit institu-
tions. The consolidating supervisor shall seek joint decisions with the competent au-
thorities supervising the group’s subsidiaries on  key-aspects of prudential group-
supervision, particularly the specifications on sufficient own funds on both the con-
solidated as well as the entity level with regard to the application of Banking Di-
rective  artt. 123, 124 and 136(2)  [CRD IV Directive artt. 72(1), 92  (1), (2)  and 
100].119 The EBA may be consulted to reach a settlement if differences between the 
responsible authorities occur. 120 Yet, ultimately the decision of the consolidating su-
pervisor prevails.121 Furthermore, competent authorities responsible for the supervi-
sion of controlled credit institutions are under the obligation to contact the consoli-
dating supervisor prior to implementing approaches and methodologies in order to 
obtain pertinent information available at the top level.122 Finally, competent authori-
ties shall consult each other prior to taking any action with regard to certain critical 
issues at the supervised banks, in particular structural changes concerning a member 
                                                                                                                                        
parties accumulate and constitute a massive concentrated risk although individual large ex-
posure limits (cf. supra note 70) are observed. For a brief review of the rationale for consoli-
date supervision see e.g. RONALD MACDONALD, CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BANKS 11-14 
(1998)  available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Documents/ccbs/handbooks/pdf/ccbshb15.pdf.  
117 In a rather nested way, Banking Directive art. 4(1)(2)(4)(14)(15) defines the latter 
as the legal entity at the top of the cross-border banking-group within the E.U., i.e. the top-
E.U. subsidiary of an international banking-group where the global parent is domiciled out-
side the E.U. is subject to E.U.-consolidated supervision. In fact, this approach is pretty simi-
lar to that under the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act, cf. supra 1.2.2. 
118 Whereas a “credit institution” as defined by Banking Directive art. 4(1) engages in 
classical banking business (deposit and credit transactions), a “financial institution” within 
the scope of Banking Directive art. 4(5) provides any service from a broader array of finan-
cial activities listed in Banking Directive Annex I no. 2 to 12 and 15 ranging from consumer 
credit provision to investment banking and portfolio management. Same in CRD IV Regula-
tion art. 4 (1) and (3). 
119 Banking Directive art. 129(3) para 1 [CRD IV Directive art. 108 (1)(a)]. 
120 Banking Directive art. 129(3) para 2 [CRD IV Directive art. 108 (2)(a)]. 
121 Banking Directive art. 129(3) para 3 [CRD Directive art. 108 (2)]. 
122 Banking Directive art. 132(2) [CRD IV Directive art. 112 (3)]. 29 
 
of the banking-group that require approval, major sanctions and exceptional super-
visory measures.123 
  home Member State  host Member State 
subsidiary-structure 
authorization and supervi-
sion of parent 
 
consolidating supervision of 
group 
authorization and supervi-
sion of legally independ-
ent subsidiaries in cooper-
ation with consolidating 
supervisor (home Member 
State authority) 
 
participation in consolidat-
ing supervision 
branch-structure 
authorization and supervi-
sion of bank incl. Foreign 
activities (on-site  investiga-
tions etc.) 
 
no authorization (E.U.-
passport) 
 
supervision of liquidity 
endowment in coopera-
tion with home Member 
State authority 
Table 1: home-/host-Member State competence and cooperation in micro-
prudential bank supervision according to Banking Directive 
4.2.3 COLLEGES OF SUPERVISORS 
Both, the supervision of business entities and consolidated supervision of 
transnational banking groups requires a good deal of cooperation or at least infor-
mation exchange. European law mandates permanent bodies that constitute an in-
stitutional framework which seeks to streamline and intensify but also keep flexible 
the procedures national supervisors follow in discharging their cooperative obliga-
tions.124 
Colleges of Supervisors provide the framework that facilitates the exchange of 
information and coordination among the consolidating supervisors and the other 
competent authorities involved in the supervision of a  cross-border banking 
group.125 However, supervisors in host Member States where the group carries out 
                                            
123 Banking Directive art. 132(3) [CRD IV Directive ar. 112 (4)]. 
124 Originally, the E.U. advocated  plans to establish global Colleges of Supervisors 
with a detailed proposal to the G-20 Washington Summit in November 2008 cf. Tony Bar-
ber, EU Calls for Tighter Financial Controls, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008. The idea also plays a 
prominent role in the envisioned regime for the resolution of cross-border banking groups 
where Proposal Resolution Directive, art. 81 mandates the establishment of European reso-
lution colleges. 
125 Banking Directive art. 131a [CRD IV Directive art. 111]. On the particular tasks of 
a College, see Banking Directive art. 131a(1)(a)-(f). For a detailed guideline on carrying out 
the relevant duties and responsibilities, see COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS 
(CEBS), GUIDELINES FOR THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONING OF SUPERVISORY COLLEGES (GL 34) 30 
 
its activities through branches are usually not members of these Colleges. Banking 
Directive art. 42a(3) [CRD IV Directive art. 52 (3)] provides a notable exception if a 
branch is deemed systemically important (“significant”) from the perspective of its 
host Member State.126 The critical determination whether a branch is significant is 
initiated by its host Member State and should be reached in consensus with the con-
solidating or home Member State supervisor. However, ultimately the assessment of 
the host Member State’s competent authority prevails.127 
Even where Colleges of Supervisors are established they merely provide a fo-
rum for exchange between national authorities, that is, they have no power to inter-
fere with a Member States competent authority’s supervisory practice.128 
4.2.4 SUPRANATIONAL COMPETENCES AS AN INSUFFICIENT REMEDY 
Obviously, where a cumbersome division of labor between national authori-
ties potentially inhibits effective prudential supervision, elevating competences on a 
supranational level becomes appealing.129 It takes no wonder that U.S. fiscal federal-
ism, starting with the reforms initiated by Alexander Hamilton is analyzed as a tem-
plate for Europe today.130  Clearly, the E.U. with its long standing history of ever 
closer economic integration and legal harmonization  provides an institutional 
framework that is, in theory, suitable in an unrivalled manner to follow down this 
road. However, until the very recent past, efforts to harmonize the regulatory 
framework of prudential bank supervision were largely limited to substantive law 
(4.2.4.1) and established only marginal supranational competences in the pertinent 
laws’ administration and enforcement (4.2.4.2). Bolder steps taken a few days ago as 
a reaction to the still lingering crisis in the Euro area’s banking sector aspire to estab-
lish a stronger supranational institution as a building block of a more closely inte-
                                                                                                                                        
(2010)  available at  http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/Publications/Standards---
Guidelines/2010/Colleges/CollegeGuidelines.aspx.    
126 Banking Directive art. 42a(1)(a)-(c) [CRD IV Directive art. 52 (1)] give particular 
weight in determining the significance of a bank’s foreign branch to a three-factor test and 
look at (i) the branch’s share in the deposit market (>2%), (ii) its relevance for market li-
quidity and the payment and clearing and settlement system, (iii) the number of clients it 
serves. 
127 Cf. Banking Directive art. 42a(1) para 4 [CRD IV Directive art. 52 (1) para 4]. 
128 Banking Directive art. 131a(1) [CRD IV Diective art. 111 (1)] explicitly stipulates 
that “The establishment of and functioning of colleges of supervisors shall not affect the 
rights and responsibilities of the competent authorities under this Directive.” 
129 See also Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration: Don’t Put the Cart before 
the Horse, 15 FIN. MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 57, 97-98 (2006) (mainly pointing 
to the shortcomings of the home country rule in bail-out situations). 
130 For an astute and differentiating essay that concludes inter alia with the recom-
mendation to harmonize banking regulation see C. RANDALL HENNING & MARTIN KESSLER, 
FISCAL FEDERALISM: U.S. HISTORY FOR ARCHITECTS OF EUROPE’S FISCAL UNION 31 (2012) avail-
able at  http://www.bruegel.org/download/parent/669-fiscal-federalism-us-history-for-
architects-of-europes-fiscal-union/file/1537-fiscal-federalism-us-history-for-architects-of-
europes-fiscal-union/. For a macroeconomic analysis of the much broader topic see e.g. the 
Nobel lecture of 2011’s laureate, Thomas J. Sargent, United States then, Europe now 
(Working Paper, 2011) available at 
https://files.nyu.edu/ts43/public/research/Sargent_Sweden_final.pdf. 31 
 
grated European fiscal union (4.2.4.3). Yet, the emerging structure of the suprana-
tional supervisor  seems to become only a somewhat halfhearted remedy for the 
shortcomings and pitfalls identified.    
4.2.4.1 HARMONIZATION OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
The critical importance of financial institutions for Europe’s developed econ-
omies and the perceived need to foster competition by creating a level playing field 
accounted for an early start in a far reaching harmonization of substantive laws. The 
First Coordination Directive that harmonized the prerequisites for authorization was 
promulgated in 1977.131 It was followed by a series of smaller legislatory advances132 
until a  Second  Coordination Directive in  1989  was promulgated  that  facilitated 
cross-border banking  through subsidiaries and branches in a meaningful way. 133 
Prudential supervision of European credit institutions became early attuned to the 
recommendations of the BCBS with the transposition of the Basel I-Accord134 in 
1989.135 This policy was maintained with the Basel II-Accord136 becoming binding 
European law with the promulgation of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
in 2006.137 These Directives were subsequently amended by the CRD II138 and CRD 
                                            
131 First Council Directive 77/780 on the Coordination of the Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit 
Institutions,  1977 O.J. (L 322) 30. 
132 For a brief account cf. Peter O. Mülbert & Alexander Wilhelm, Reforms of EU 
Banking and Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis, 26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 187, 
194 (2011). 
133 Second Council Directive 89/646 on the Coordination of the Laws, Regulations 
and  Administrative  Provisions  Relating to the Taking  Up and Pursuit of the Business of 
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. 
134 BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(1988) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf. 
135 Council Directive 89/299/EEC of 17 April 1989 on the own funds of credit institu-
tions, 1989 O.J.(L 124) 16 which regarded a bank sufficiently capitalized if it held capital 
amounting to 8% of its risk-weighted assets with a tier 1-fraction of 50%, that is 4% of total 
assets. 
136  BCBS,  INTERNATIONAL  CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL  MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS (2004) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf, later incorporated into 
a more comprehensive version that reflected further amendments to the 1988 recommenda-
tions,  see  BCBS,  INTERNATIONAL  CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL  MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
STANDARDS (2006) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf. 
137 The Basel II-Accord and its implementation in the Banking Directive and the Par-
liament and Council Directive 2006/49 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and 
credit institutions, 2006 O.J. (L 177) 201 [hereinafter CAD] – jointly referred to as Capital 
Requirements Directive – aimed at improving the own funds-requirements by providing for 
a more accurate calculation of the risk actually inherent in a bank’s business. Moreover, the 
new rules introduced two new “pillars” in prudential supervision, to wit ongoing supervi-
sion and disclosure to foster market discipline. For a critical review see e.g. Jan H. Dalhui-
sen, Financial Services, Products, Risks and Regulation in Europe after the EU 1988 Action 
Plan and Basel II, 18 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 819, 1032-39, 1081-82 (2007); for a general descrip-
tion of the recommendations content see Razeen Sappideen, The Regulation of Credit, Mar-
ket and Operational Risk Management under the Basel Accords, 2004 J. BUS. L. 59. 
138 Parliament and Council Directive 2009/111 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 
2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards Banks  Affiliated to Central  Institutions,  Certain 32 
 
III139 reform-packages that responded to lessons derived from the financial crisis.140 
Similarly, the most recent, profound overhaul of the BCBS’ recommendations in 
reaction to the financial crisis (Basel III-Accord141) will most likely make its way into 
ambitious European legislation that aspires to base prudential supervision on a com-
prehensively harmonized and binding single rule book.142    
4.2.4.2 CURRENT SUPRANATIONAL COMPETENCES IN MICRO-PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
Despite these long-standing and significant advances in the harmonization of 
the substantive regulations, only consultative and coordinative functions were allo-
cated on the supranational level. In 2003 the Commission appointed the European 
Banking Committee (EBC)143 and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS)144 that should give expert advice to rulemakers and coordinate the admin-
istration of the promulgated regulatory framework.  
Following a proposal from an expert group headed by Jacques de Larosière145 
the new European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was created.146 With re-
gard to the supervision of transnational credit institutions147 the new architecture 
created several bodies at the European level, however without conferring sweeping 
competences in the ongoing supervision of banks to them. The EBA based in Lon-
don became tasked with duties in micro-prudential supervision of individual finan-
                                                                                                                                        
Own Funds Items, Large Exposures, Supervisory Arrangements, and Crisis Management, 
2009 O.J. (L 302) 97. 
139 Parliament and Council Directive 2010/76 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC as regards Capital Requirements for the Trading Book and for Resecuritisations, 
and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, 2010 O.J. (L 329) 3. 
140 For an overview Mülbert & Wilhelm, supra note 132 at 202-7. 
141 BCBS, Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Stand-
ards and Monitoring (2010) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf. 
142 Supra note 30. 
143 Commission Decision 2004/10 (EC) of 5 November 2003 establishing the Europe-
an Banking Committee, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 36 and Commission Decision 2004/5 (EC) of 5 No-
vember 2003 establishing the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 2004 O.J. (L 3) 
28. 
144 Commission Decision 2004/10 (EC) of 5 November 2003 establishing the Europe-
an Banking Committee, 2004 O.J. (L 3) 36. 
145 High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report (Feb. 25, 2009) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf.  
146 For detailed descriptions and assessments see Eddy Wymeersch, The Reforms of 
the European Financial Supervisory System, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 240, 252-64 
(2010); Niamh Moloney, EU Financial Market Regulation after the Global Finacial Crisis: 
‘More Europe’ or more Risk? 47 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1317, 1332-35, 1365-72 (2010); 
Marco Lamandini, When More is Needed: The European Financial Supervisory Reform and 
Its Legal Basis, 6 EUR. COMPANY L. 197, 199-202 (2009). 
147 Identical structures were established for the supervision of securities markets, in-
surances and occupational pension schemes, cf.  Parliament and Council Regulation 
1095/2010(EU) of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (Eu-
ropean Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 84 and Parliament and Council 
Regulation 1095/2010(EU) of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Au-
thority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 48.  33 
 
cial institutions in January 2011.148 A non-trivial function of the EBA lies in its pow-
er to draft both regulatory and implementing technical standards.149 Still, to become 
binding these standards require the formal endorsement of the Commission who has 
the power to reject standards in part or amend them,150 thereby depriving the EBA 
of its already very limited propensity for independent rulemaking.151  
The EBA may further issue guidelines and recommendations addressed to 
Member State’s supervisors to achieve a homogenous supervisory practice. Yet, to 
realize this goal the EBA has to rely on a comply-or-explain-mechanism and the 
pressure that emanates from publishing the mere fact of non-compliance by a Mem-
ber State’s competent authority.152 Where disputes among Member States’ compe-
tent authorities that supervise a transnational banking-group arise, the EBA at the 
request of a national authority or on its own initiative serves primarily as a media-
tor. But it can ultimately, albeit after a lengthy “conciliation phase” settle the con-
troversy and issue a binding decision that requires national authorities to take or 
refrain from action.153 Only where the EBA acts to stabilize financial markets after 
the Council has determined that an emergency situation exists, may it bypass na-
tional supervisors who do not comply with binding emergency-orders and take ac-
tion directly vis-à-vis financial institutions.154 
Finally, in order to improve macro-prudential supervision a further new 
body, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established and charged with 
monitoring and assessing the systemic risks threatening financial stability thereby 
cooperating and coordinating with international and non-E.U. country institu-
tions.155 Its main instrument to counter detected systemic risks in the financial sys-
tem consists of warnings and recommendations addressed at either the European 
Union, the EBA, individual Member States or these Member States’ banking author-
ities that are subject to a largely confidential comply-or-explain-mechanism.156 Quite 
importantly, the ESRB receives its information within the network of the ESFS 
                                            
148 Parliament and Council Regulation 1095/2010(EU) of 24 November 2010 estab-
lishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), 2010 O.J. (L 331) 
12 [hereinafter EBA-Regulation]. 
149 EBA-Regulation art. 8(1)(a), 10, 15. The former seek to ensure the consistent 
harmonization of national laws where E.U. Directives have been promulgated, cf. TFEU art. 
290(1). The latter aim at a uniform application of E.U.-Regulations, cf. TFEU art. 291(2). 
150 EBA-Regulation art. 10(1) subparagraph 5. 
151 Niamh Moloney, The Financial Crisis and EU Securities Law-Making: A Challenge 
Met? in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KLAUS J. HOPT 2265, 2273 (Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar, Han-
no Merkt, Peter O. Mülbert & Marina Wellenhofer eds. 2010). 
152 EBA-Regulation art. 16(2). 
153 EBA-Regulation art. 19. 
154 EBA-Regulation art. 18. 
155 Parliament and Council Regulation 1092/2010 (EU) of 24 November 2010 on Eu-
ropean Union Macro-Prudential Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board, artt. 3, 15, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 [hereinafter ERSB-Regulation]. 
For a critical assessment on the ESRB’s effectiveness see Mülbert & Wilhelm, supra note 132 
at 199; see also Giovanna De Mincio, Regulators and Rules – President Obama’s Reforms vs. 
Europe’s Reforms, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 451, 454-457 (2010) (comparing the – then pro-
posed – U.S. Financial Services Oversight Council with the ESRB). 
156 ERSB-Regulation artt. 16-18. 34 
 
which is supposed to link national and supranational authorities making the ESRB 
depend on the exchange of information and cooperation among these agents. 
4.2.4.3 BANKING UNION 2012 
In the wake of the once again flaring and more and more deteriorating bank-
ing crisis in Spain157 it became obvious that the counter-measures taken so far were 
insufficient to break the vicious cycle between the sovereign debt-crisis in the Euro 
area and the distress in the European financial sector.158 As already hinted by ob-
servers of the European developments,159 the way forward was seen in a further in-
tegration that included as a critical component establishing a single European bank-
ing supervisor, involving the ECB.160 Clearly, this is in line with economic theory 
that relates the existence of international organizations to the desire to eliminate the 
risk of opportunism ex post161 – a specter dreaded by Member States who effectively 
provide the bail-out funds for other E.U.-members with a troubled and arguably in-
sufficiently overseen banking sector.162 Moreover, it can be seen as a ‘regional ver-
sion’  that follows suggestions from commentators163 and prominent transnational 
bodies.164  
                                            
157 See Forelle & Steinhauser, supra note 51.  
158 For the relationship see supra 2.1.2.  
159 Cf. supra note 129. 
160 This political determination clearly became manifest for the first time at the Euro 
Area Summit on June 29, 2012, cf. Press Release, Euro Area Summit Statement (June 29, 
2012)  available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131359.pdf. Earlier, the 
Commission had expressed the top E.U.-administration’s conviction that a single financial 
supervisor was of critical importance in establishing an ultimately comprehensive Economic 
and Monetary Union, cf.   Commission Communication, Action for Stability, Growth and 
Jobs, at 5, COM(2012) 299 final (May 30, 2012) 
161 JOEL  P.  TRACHTMAN,  THE  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL  LAW  150-195 
(2008) (analyzing international organizations in line with the Coasean theory of the firm in 
institutional economics); Barbara Koremos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational 
Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (understanding interna-
tional organizations as a network of contracts between sovereign agents); on forming a un-
ion (integration) as a means to reduce the potential for opportunism in an anarchy see gen-
erally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 21 
(1985). 
162 On the package deal that couples further injection of funds into troubled Member 
States’ banks with establishing a supranational supervisor see Francesco Guerrera, A Fix for 
Europe Banks, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2012 at C1. 
163 For calls for global regulators and/or monitors see e.g. Henry Kaufman, Structural 
Changes in the Financial Markets: Economic and Policy Significance, 79 FED. RES. BANK OF 
KAN. CITY ECON. REV. 5 (1994); Richard Dale & Simon Wolf, The Structure of Financial Reg-
ulation, 6 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 326 (1998). 
164 Financial Stability Forum, Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resili-
ence 52 (2008) available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf; 
Press Release, European Council, 2901st Council Meeting Economic and Financial Affairs 7 
(Nov. 4, 2008) available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/103804.pdf. 35 
 
The Commission plans to make detailed proposals on such a single superviso-
ry mechanism in September 2012 that the Council – which generally endorses the 
plans165 – can consider as a matter of urgency at the end of the year.166 Currently, 
the design and the scope of the new authority remain unclear. Speculations consider 
the most likely outcome of the cumbersome quest for a political compromise that 
significant reservations of Member States’ competence will remain intact despite the 
creation of a supranational watchdog: the “single” European supervisor shall proba-
bly only cover Europe’s largest banks,167 leaving the oversight over mid-sized bank-
ing groups despite their sizeable cross-border operations in the national domains.  
However, the attempt to couple further state-aid for the banking sector with a 
groundbreaking reform to achieve its more rigid supervision exhibits a deep mistrust 
in the existing supervisory architecture that seems justified. 
4.3  EVALUATION 
In order to assess if the current or the evolving European supervisory archi-
tecture provides or will provide an effective tool for micro-prudential supervision in 
light of banks’ organizational choices, agencies should not be treated as black-boxes. 
Instead, incentives of agents who actually discharge the duties of the supervisory 
authorities, who either offer or refuse to exchange information and collaborate with 
due diligence, have to be examined closely. To this end, general considerations on 
the political economics of public administration  and international relations prove 
helpful (4.3.1) and can serve as analytical basis to reach a final evaluation of the 
E.U. supervisory architecture (4.3.2).   
4.3.1 POLITICAL ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION  AND  INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 
If it is true, that the success of the supervisory architecture depends on incen-
tives of public officers (bureaucrats) in charge at the competent authorities, it is im-
portant to remember the motivating forces identified in the line of research that ap-
plies methodologies from organizational theory to the political and administrative 
process.168 The line-up under scrutiny can be framed using the analytical inventory 
of agency-theory: bureaucrats constitute agents who have some discretion that al-
                                            
165 Press Release, European Council, 3181st Council Meeting Economic and Financial 
Affairs  8 (July 10, 2012) available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131686.pdf 
166 Press Release, Eurogroup Statement on the follow-up of the 29 June Euro Sum-
mit  (July 10, 2012) available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131648.pdf. 
167 See Matina Stevis & Stephen Fidler, Tighter Control for Euro Banks, WALL ST. J., 
July 9, 2012 at A1. 
168 For programmatic articles see Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The In-
dustrial Organization of Congress, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988); Terry M. Moe, Politics and 
the Theory of Organization, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 106 (1991); but also GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965). See also supra note 161.  36 
 
lows them to adapt the political system to unforeseen contingencies, 169 but  also 
grants them leeway to take hidden action and pursue their own interest instead of 
that of their ultimate principals (the citizens).170 The intrinsic motives that are com-
monly identified as driving agency personnel in their exercise of office account for 
actions that serve the principals’ interest only suboptimally.171  
Quite importantly, another source of departure from the social goal of effec-
tive supervision of cross-border banking-groups typical in the transnational context 
results from the observation that the obligations of national authorities to share in-
formation and to cooperate in micro-prudential supervision can, by and large, only 
be enforced through informal institutions that sanction non-cooperative behavior.172 
If these insights are related to the prior findings on the political economics of bu-
reaucracies it can be concluded that reputational losses,173 the threat of reciprocity in 
case of breach,174 and further retaliation175 will only serve as a motivation if these 
sanctions not only exist in the relation between authorities but also translate into 
concurrent incentives of individual personnel.   
According to standard analysis176 bureaucrats are driven by a desire to in-
crease their personal power and to augment their prestige. They thus seek to enlarge 
their agency’s size, competence and right to intervene in the affairs of those falling 
within the scope its mandate. They will discharge their duties in a way that allows 
them to acquire a favorable reputation among their peers and/or in the general pub-
lic and the media. Moreover, opportunities to advance their future career in admin-
istration, politics or the private sector motivate their behavior which makes them 
prone to promoting the interests of those who offer the most desirable job-
                                            
169 On the importance of a mechanism for a discretionary adaption of the (incom-
plete) social contract see DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 80-81 (1990). 
170 For an overview of various models see TIMOTHY BEASLY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS 98-
172 (2006). Bounded rationality of principals – ultimate (citizens) or intermediate (legisla-
tors) – who cannot devise complete contingent constitutions and laws to secure the proper 
pursuit of the common good, plays a prominent role in all these models. 
171 See generally George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 
3 (1971); Canice Pendergast, The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 
180 (2007); for the role of cognitive biases that tend to aggravate the deviation from desi-
rable outcomes cf. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); for an analysis with particular view to the governance of financial 
supervisors see Luca Enriques & Gérard Hertig, Improving the Governance of Financial Su-
pervisors, 12 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 357, 362-63 (2011). 
172 For a general analysis of the self-enforcing mechanisms in international law from 
an economists perspective cf. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 33-48 
(2008). 
173 On this aspect Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 
27, 29 (1980). 
174 GUZMAN supra note 172 at 45. 
175 id. at 48. See also ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 12-13 (1984) 
(describing a tit for tat-game where agents behave cooperatively in the first round and act in 
the second round as the counterparty did in the first). 
176 For the following see Stigler supra note 171; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAU-
CRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36-42 (1971); Pendergast supra note 171. 37 
 
opportunities in the long term and can result in regulatory capture.177 Finally, agen-
cy personnel seek to avoid liability for false actions or forbearance and will conse-
quentially have a proclivity to follow approved practices that can be verified in any 
review, even if new developments occur.  
To be sure, the identified incentives do not necessarily warrant a pessimistic 
perception of bureaucrats’ effectiveness,178 e.g. their desire for prestige can constitute 
a powerful incentive to do “a good job” but it may also revert to a less desirable ea-
gerness for media presence.179 The observations only highlight the fact that these 
individuals are not robots that are automatically programmed to serve the public 
interest.     
4.3.2 SUPERVISION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING-GROUPS IN PARTICULAR 
The convolute hierarchies and the necessary exchange of information and co-
operation that the current E.U.-supervisory architecture mandates,180 create particu-
larly suboptimal incentives for decision-makers at the authorities involved and is 
prone for ‘turf wars’ among supervisors with diverging preferences. This can be illus-
trated with regard to those cross-border banking-groups that have organized accord-
ing to the subsidiary model (4.3.2.1) but it also holds – albeit to a lesser degree – 
with respect to transnational branch-structures (4.3.2.2). Currently evolving supra-
national institutions may provide some improvement but no ultimate cure to the 
problems identified (4.3.2.3). 
4.3.2.1 SUBSIDIARIES 
An extraordinary dedication to performing supervisory functions that at least 
in part contribute to the benefit of foreign economies do not yield immediate gains 
in power or prestige for the bureaucrats at the acting authority compared to similar 
efforts in purely domestic line-ups. This is not only true with regard to a (subordi-
nate) competent authority that is supposed to contribute to effective consolidated 
supervision but also with respect to a consolidating supervisor. To some extent, her 
                                            
177 For a general theory of how and when interest-group’s dominate regulatory deci-
sion processes see Jean-Jacque Laffont  & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision 
Making. A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089 (1991); with a specific view 
to the banking sector Daniel C. Hardy, Regulatory Capture in Banking (Int’l Monetary Fund, 
Working Paper WP/06/34, 2006) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp0634.pdf. 
178 For at least ambiguous assessments of the complex web of incentives and its in-
herent trade-offs see already Michael Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Pub-
lic Interest and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 197 (1980); 
Gordon Tullock, A (Partial) Rehabilitation of the Public Interest Theory, 42 PUBL. CHOICE 89 
(1984). 
179 Cf. Luca Enriques, Regulators’ Response to the Current Crisis and the Upcoming 
Reregulation of Financial Markets: One Reluctant Regulator’s View, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
1147, 1150 (2009) (showing the ambivalence of regulators’ intelligence).   
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duties also ensure the viability of group affiliates abroad.181 Obviously, the benefits to 
foreign economies182 accrue as a consequence of the operations of for-profit organi-
zations whose success at least in part redounds to the incentives of bureaucrats at 
the consolidating supervisor: the growth of the supervised transnational financial 
institution can be associated with an increase in the regulator’s importance and rep-
utation and therefore its bureaucrats’ prestige. Yet, the bulk of the advantages con-
nected to a bank’s transnational activities constitutes positive externalities (growth 
perspectives, market development et al.) and is thus neither fully reproduced in the 
bank’s yields nor in the incentives that the consolidating supervisor and its officers 
incur. To a similar effect, good practices that are at least in part of an auxiliary char-
acter and mainly happen in the background do to not naturally boost careers.  
Furthermore, incentives to cooperate and share information with other com-
petent authorities are also suboptimal because lapses mutatis mutandis create nega-
tive external effects for the foreign economy where the group affiliate does business. 
Legal consequences are not a credible threat in the transnational context – even 
within the rather tightly integrated E.U.-supervisory regime no liability is attached to 
a breach of a competent authority’s duties. Moreover, it cannot be expected that 
reputational mechanisms or the threat of reciprocity make authorities and bureau-
crats internalize errors automatically or exhaustively. Quite importantly, where fi-
nancial difficulties occur and hence information sharing and cooperation becomes 
pivotal,  bureaucrats  face strong motives not to reveal their private  knowledge  – 
which would amount to a confession of shortcomings in their own realm – but ex-
ploit informational asymmetries instead.183  
To be clear, the incentive-problem identified is not that of an outright block-
ade between Member States’ supervisors or even of mutual sabotage. Yet, the lack of 
motivation ‘to go the extra mile’ in order to facilitate the socially optimal outcome 
should worry policy-makers enough if it is recalled what is at stake.184  
4.3.2.2 BRANCHES 
The E.U.-supervisory regime applicable under a branch-structure185 exhibits 
some of the problematic characteristics discussed for transnational banks that adhere 
to a subsidiary-organization. This is particularly true with regard to the suboptimal 
                                            
181 For the respective competences see supra 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.3. 
182 On the benefits of cross-border banking for market development, access to credit 
etc. see generally supra 1.1 and 3.3.  
183 Gérard Hertig, Ruben Lee & Joseph A. McCahery, Empowering the ECB to Super-
vise Banks: A Choice-Based Approach, 7 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 171, 178 (2010). For a 
formal analysis see  Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rønde, Cooperation in International 
Banking Supervision  16-22 (ECB Working Paper No. 316, 2004) available at 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp316.pdf  (showing that host country su-
pervisors have incentives to misreport private information if their preference for liquidating 
a bank’s operations diverge from those of the home country supervisor responsible for the 
decision). 
184 Supra 2. 
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incentives to cooperate and share information as a result of positive and negative 
externalities: The home Member State supervises the whole entity and thereby gen-
erates benefits and costs for the host Member State whereas the host Member State’s 
limited power and information sharing obligations have the same effect vice versa. 
Yet, it should not be overlooked, that under the branch-structure a clearer allocation 
of responsibilities occurs as a result of E.U.-passporting making the home Member 
State’s competent authority a stronger player that is less dependent on cooperation 
than the consolidating supervisor under a subsidiary structure.  
Another core feature of the supervisory-regime covering branch-structures 
deserves attention. It  appropriately augments the participation rights, where the 
branch’s operations are significant from the host Member States perspective, that is, 
where the externalities of exclusive home Member State supervision become large 
and host Member State’s bureaucrats have better incentives to participate (e.g. by 
communicating macro-economic threats unforeseen by remote home Member State 
supervisors) as their efforts to prevent their national economy from the failure of a 
systemically important branch are likely to be honored more adequately. Hence, the 
criteria set out in Banking Directive art. 42a that warrant a stronger involvement of 
host Member States competent authorities are more attuned to the actual risk and 
incentive structures than those under the subsidiary-model where the strong host 
Member State participation is indiscriminately linked to the authorization of the af-
filiates. 
4.3.2.3 SUPRANATIONAL CURE 
It is obvious that the reforms promulgated thus far remedy the shortcomings 
of the current E.U.-supervisory regime only insufficiently as they leave the compe-
tences in micro-prudential supervision by and large vested with Member State’s au-
thorities.186 As a result, the need for extensive cooperation and information sharing 
persists and the incentives of bureaucrats remain substantially unaltered.  Superviso-
ry Colleges may in fact have some impact in this respect as personal acquaintance 
among the responsible bureaucrats adds a stronger relational element to their rela-
tionship and makes the adherence to cooperative strategies more likely at the mar-
gin.187 Yet, the effect can cut both ways and should not be overestimated anyway – 
the colleges of supervisors are no country clubs!    
In principle, the evolving single European banking supervisor188 could avoid 
many of the incentive deficits identified in respect of the current regime of micro-
prudential supervision if and to the extent to which its competence in fact makes 
cooperation with national authorities superfluous. Although it comes to gazing into 
a crystal ball if the challenge is to foresee the future structure, it is not entirely im-
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tual) relationships see Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. 
ECON. 426 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies –  in 
General and With Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).  
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plausible that the E.U.-supervisor – at least initially until a full-fledged and autono-
mous agency is actually up and running – will have to rely on some cooperation and 
information sharing with national supervisors, ESFS authorities etc. Yet such a tem-
porary backslide into the thickets of intra-agency cooperation could prove tempo-
rary. As of now, however, it seems that the political will does not suffice to indeed 
create an omnibus supranational agency.189 Moreover, it is even unlikely that the 
Commission that has to respond to severe time pressure will immediately provide 
for an opt-in solution that some commentators have advocated.190  
All in all it seems warranted to still think about improvements of the existing 
framework that will in any case remain applicable to those transnational banks that 
will not fall within the ambit of E.U.-supervision. Such alternative solutions are all 
the more relevant as the option of supranational concentration is not readily availa-
ble on a global level. Hence, cooperation and exchange between national or – for 
that purpose – supranational authorities remains the only viable road to pursue.191 
As a consequence, the Financial Stability Board recommends with a view to global 
SIFIs that „[j]urisdictions should provide for a national supervisory framework that 
enables effective consolidated supervision by addressing ambiguities of responsibili-
ties, impairments related to information gathering and assessment when multiple 
supervisors are overseeing the institution and its affiliates.”192 Clearly, the institu-
tional framework for such cooperative supervisions should be designed as efficiently 
as possible.        
5  SKETCHING AN  ALTERNATIVE  APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL  BANKING 
SUPERVISION 
In light of the aforesaid, attempts to improve micro-prudential supervision 
through law reform that compels closer cooperation and improved exchange of in-
                                            
189 Supra at note 167. 
190 Ivan Mortimer-Schutts, EU Regulatory and Supervisory Convergence: The Case 
for a Dual System with Choice (Am. Enterprise Inst. Working Paper No. 39, 2005) available 
at  http://www.gem.sciences-
po.fr/content/publications/pdf/IMS_1205_Dual_EU_Reg_Struct.pdf  (arguing for individual 
banks’ right to choose a 28th E.U.-supervisory regime); Martin Čihák & Jörg Decressin, The 
Case for a European Banking Charter (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/173, 
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pervisor see Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 
99 GEO. L.J. 257, 312-15 (2011); but see also Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooper-
ation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Net-
works, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 273-283 (2010) (advocating an international administrative 
law agency for financial supervision). 
192 Cf. Financial Stability Board, Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions,  Recommendation No. 33 (October 20, 2010) available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111a.pdf.  For the various institu-
tions facilitating global coordination of financial regulators cf. Eric J. Pan, Challenge of In-
ternational Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Trans-
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formation between national and supranational supervisors will only be successful if 
the pertinent formal institutions are basically in line with the acting bureaucrats’ 
incentives and minimize inefficient cooperative elements. 
At the outset, competences in micro-prudential supervision should be allocat-
ed to one national or supranational competent authority as unambiguously as possi-
ble to capitalize on the expertise of established supervisors.193 In fact, it is structurally 
possible to establish precisely the strong authority that is arguably required to break 
through the vicious cycle of banking and sovereign debt crises194 on the national lev-
el, if the effective powers of such a single authority are mutually recognized195 at 
least between E.U.-Member States. As a consequence, national authorities that are 
the home of a transnational banking group can function as de facto pan-European 
supervisors.196 Importantly, the sole competence of such a pan-European supervisor 
should in principle be independent from the cross-border banking group’s legal 
structure. Hence, subjecting the supervision of independently incorporated subsidi-
aries to the consolidating supervisor’s authority197 deserves approval, yet it does not 
go far enough in this subordination. It is preferable to generally follow the branch-
model when it comes to defining the competences in micro-prudential supervision 
that gives host Member State authorities only very limited scope in monitoring on-
going operations.  
As an exception,  additional  competences  should be given to host Member 
States where the banking-group’s activities are deemed significant from the perspec-
tive of the foreign economy. Once again, the branch-model can serve as the princi-
pal template where host Member States authorities are granted an additional right to 
participate in Colleges of Supervisors if the branch is deemed significant.198 However, 
in the latter case – and only in this case – host Member State authorities should re-
ceive competences like those that currently accrue generally with regard to subsidi-
aries. Moreover, the binding determination if the group’s activities on the pertinent 
market are in fact significant should be made by a supranational authority like the 
EBA or the evolving single European supervisor. 
In the context of the evolving resolution regime for transnational banking 
groups, the Commission basically accepts the fundamental need for a strong (na-
                                            
193 After all, the single European supervisor doesn’t come cheaply: in the Annex to 
the Legislative Financial Statement the Commission estimates the additional costs for per-
sonnel, infrastructure and operation that would accrue were the relatively modest expan-
sions of the EBA competences under the Proposal Resolution Directive actually promulgated 
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194  Press Release, Euro Area Summit Statement (June 29, 2012) available at 
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Recognition in International Finance, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 55, 60-71 (2011). 
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tional) lead-authority when it explicitly posits in its explanatory memorandum that 
it is of critical importance that ultimately a single decision prevails.199 Of course, it 
strictly clings to the problematic distinction between a bank’s subsidiaries and 
branches. 
The paradigm shift advocated here retraces the developments in the substan-
tive law of prudential supervision that also went from a relatively inflexible ap-
proach to a set of rules that aims at capturing actual risks in banks.200 It also reflects 
the persuasion, that not only within the E.U. any potential for regulatory arbitrage 
by switching from one organizational model to the other are unwarranted. Fur-
thermore, as banking supervision forces  competent authorities to employ highly 
skilled personnel and compete with the private sector, it is doubtful that each and 
every Member State’s agency can retain a sufficient number of qualified specialists. 
It may thus be a welcome side-effect of the proposed regime that it also avoids re-
dundancies and requires host Member States only to monitor significant activities 
more closely. Of course, the suggested architecture – like any regulatory and super-
visory regime that relies on public agencies – assumes that national authorities have 
efficient governance-structures that ensure a socially beneficial administration.201 
 
                                            
199 Proposal Resolution Directive at 6. 
200 Supra 4.2.4.1.  
201 For an astute proposal of efficient governance-structures at financial supervisors, 
see Enriques & Hertig supra note 170 at 365-73; see also Anita Anand & Andrew Green, 
Regulating Financial Institutions: The Value of Opacity, 57 MCGILL L.J. 399, 408-422 (2012) 
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